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A FAIR TRIAL: WHEN THE CONSTITUTION 
REQUIRES ATTORNEYS TO INVESTIGATE 
THEIR CLIENTS’ BRAINS 
Ellen G. Koenig* 
ABSTRACT 
The U.S. Constitution guarantees every criminal defendant the 
right to a fair trial.  This fundamental right includes the right to a 
defense counsel who provides effective assistance.  To be effective, 
attorneys must sometimes develop specific types of evidence in 
crafting the best defense.  In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has found that defense attorneys did not provide effective assistance 
when they failed to consider neuroscience.  But when must defense 
attorneys develop neuroscience in order to provide effective 
assistance?  This question is difficult because the standard for 
determining effective assistance is still evolving.  There are two 
leading approaches.  First, in Strickland v. Washington, the Court 
adopted a two-prong “reasonableness” test, which, according to 
Justice O’Conner, may result in court decisions that fail to properly 
protect a criminal defendant’s rights.  Recently, courts have adopted a 
second approach based on guidelines promulgated by the American 
Bar Association. 
This Note aims to answer this question.  It first provides a 
background on the right to effective assistance of counsel and briefly 
describes neuroscience evidence, oppositions to and limitations on in 
its use, and its admissibility in court.  Second, this Note attempts to 
give some guidance to attorneys by exploring the American Bar 
Association and U.S. Supreme Court standards.  Third, it summarizes 
the results of a statistical analysis conducted by the author, which 
helps further define when courts require attorneys to develop 
neuroscience evidence.  It concludes by arguing that attorneys need 
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guidance to ensure they are not violating the Sixth Amendment.  This 
Note expands on the American Bar Association’s standard and 
suggests a framework attorneys may use to determine whether they 
should develop neuroscience evidence to ensure that their client has a 
fair trial. 
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INTRODUCTION 
David Perkins was brutally attacked by several men when he was 
twenty years old.1  Although it is unclear what precipitated the attack, 
the impact on Mr. Perkins was permanent.2  During the attack Mr. 
Perkins’s attackers used a pronged rake to stab Mr. Perkin’s head, 
which left a permanent hole in his skull and brain.3 Mr. Perkins also 
had a car-accident related head injury two years earlier that left him 
in a coma for five days and caused him to lose six months of memory.4  
Taken together, these two head injuries left Mr. Perkins a man with a 
hole in his skull, who occasionally blacked out, experienced blurry 
vision, and suffered from short-term memory problems5—all physical 
symptoms that neurologists say may indicate brain damage. 
Physically, these head injuries left Mr. Perkins permanently 
impaired, mentally, the effects haunted his daily life.6  After these 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Perkins v. Hall, 708 S.E.2d 335, 343 (Ga. 2011). 
 2. See id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See id. 
 6. See id. at 343–44. 
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injuries, friends, family, and acquaintances noticed he was not the 
same7––he suffered from, as the highest court in Georgia described, 
“significant personality and cognitive changes.”8  He would drink 
heavily, stare blankly into space, and suffer fits of unprovoked 
violence that he failed to remember after.9  For example, he once 
stabbed a couch with a knife and did not remember doing so 
afterwards.10 
Unfortunately, even before these head injuries Mr. Perkins’ life 
was already filled with emotional, physical, and sexual abuse.11  
Starting when he was three years old, his father beat and provided 
him with drugs and alcohol.12  The degradation continued into 
adulthood where his father would beat and urinate on him.13  
Eventually, Mr. Perkins, who suffered from depression and was 
haunted by perpetual flashbacks from the physical and sexual abuse, 
tried to commit suicide by slitting his wrists with a razor blade.14 
On Saturday, August 12, 1995, Mr. Perkins played guitar and drank 
beer in his apartment with a neighbor.15  Around midnight, without 
provocation,16 Mr. Perkins hit his neighbor with a guitar, brutally 
stabbed him with a knife eleven times, and crushed a liquor bottle 
over his head.17  At 5:00 a.m.––with bloodstains covering his 
neighbor’s body––he called his wife, who was staying at her mother’s 
house,18 and asked her to bring him over two cigarettes.19  After his 
wife came to the apartment, which was covered in blood, she left to 
call the police.20  Mr. Perkins then went to a different neighbor’s door 
to ask for some cigarettes.21  Ultimately, Mr. Perkins was found guilty 
of murder that was “outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible, and 
                                                                                                                 
 7. See id. 
 8. Id. at 343. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See id. at 342. 
 12. See id. 
 13. See id. 
 14. See id. at 342–43 
 15. See Perkins v. State, 505 S.E.2d 16, 18 (Ga. 1998) 
 16. While Perkins claims his attack was in self-defense, see Hall, 708 S.E.2d at 
339, he had no defensive wounds and the forensic evidence disproved the defense. 
See Brief for Appellee at 5, Perkins v. State, 505 S.E.2d 16 (Ga. 1998) (No. 
S98P0624), 1998 WL 34187305. 
 17. See Hall, 708 S.E.2d at 339. 
 18. See Perkins, 505 S.E.2d at 18. 
 19. See id. 
 20. See id. 
 21. See id. 
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inhuman in that it involved depravity of mind.”22  During his trial, he 
“taunted the courtroom by making boxing gestures” at the jury.23 
At trial, Mr. Perkin’s behavior was, as his appointed trial counsel 
coined, “bizarre” to say the least because he did not want his counsel 
to speak with his family or to investigate his childhood background––
he even fired one of his attorneys for asking a woman who visited him 
in jail about his mental health.24  He was adamant that he was not 
“crazy” and refused to be examined by any mental health experts.25  
His defense team did make an unsuccessful motion to have him 
committed to a psychiatric hospital to be observed and made a 
motion to have him found incompetent to stand trial, which they later 
withdrew.26 
Fifteen years later, the Georgia Supreme Court found that Mr. 
Perkins’ Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was 
violated when a jury sentenced him to death because his counsel did 
not investigate his brain injury.27  In particular, these attorneys (1) 
limited their investigation of his background to just interviewing his 
ex-wife and mother and (2) did not review his medical records.28  The 
vast majority of ineffective assistance of counsel claims are 
unsuccessful because of the strong presumption that attorneys 
effectively represent their clients.29  But in Mr. Perkins’s case, the 
court found he had a right to have neuroscience evidence––evidence 
                                                                                                                 
 22. See id. at 17. 
 23. Profiles of Inmates on Georgia’s Death Row, AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, Sept. 22, 
1997, http://chronicle.augusta.com/stories/1997/09/22/met_214998.shtml. 
 24. See id. at 340–41; Brief for Respondent at 19, Perkins v. Hall, 708 S.E.2d 335 
(2011) (No. S10A1754), 2010 WL 4955480 (“Appellant informed trial counsel that ‘he 
did not want them speaking with his family’ and he did not want trial counsel to ‘go 
into a great deal of his childhood background,’ and if trial counsel tried to discuss 
these issues despite Appellant’s position, Appellant would get confrontational.”). 
 25. See Hall, 708 S.E.2d at 344.  Perkins said he did not want to meet with the 
mental health experts because the mental health expert would want to interview 
someone, such as his wife, who would lie about him. See id. 
 26. See id. at 344, 347. 
 27. See id. at 344. 
 28. First, their background investigation consisted only of interviewing Mr. 
Perkins’s mother and ex-wife. See generally Brief for Respondent, Hall, 708 S.E.2d 
335 (No. S10A1754). They also interviewed some jail inmates who could testify to his 
mental health. See id. at 20.  Perkins’s mother led the defense attorneys to believe 
that no one else in the family would be willing to participate in Mr. Perkins’s defense 
and the attorneys took this assertion at face value. See id.  Second, they also failed to 
acquire the medical records from the rake attack––records that the habeas attorneys 
had no problem acquiring––which would have demonstrated how the rake literally 
penetrated Mr. Perkins. See Hall, 708 S.E.2d at 340, 343. 
 29. See infra Part II.B. 
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of his brain injury––developed by defense counsel.30  This Note aims 
to better explain why in this case and others like it, the Sixth 
Amendment quite simply requires counsel to develop neuroscience 
evidence regardless of the defendant’s wishes.31 
This Note is one of the first pieces of scholarly research exclusively 
dedicated to understanding when the Sixth Amendment requires 
attorneys to use neuroscience evidence.32  Scholarship on this topic is 
long overdue as courts across the nation––from the U.S. Supreme 
Court down to local county courts—find the Sixth Amendment may 
require counsel to develop neuroscience evidence when preparing 
their cases.33 
Neuroscience is highly technical and sometimes controversial.  As a 
result, attorneys may not intuitively know that the Sixth Amendment 
requires them to develop this evidence.  Yet in recent times, 
uncovering what is contained in the human brain has become not only 
a mission for doctors, academics, and scholars, but also a central 
mission of the federal government.34  As neuroscience inevitably 
advances, the connection or lack thereof, between the human brain 
and crime may become better known.  Consequently, neuroscience 
may find its way ever more into our nation’s criminal courtrooms.35 
                                                                                                                 
 30. See Hall, 708 S.E.2d at 344. 
 31. See id. 
 32. Based on preemption searches conducted on Bloomberg, WestlawClassic, 
WestlawNext, and LexisNexis search databases.  Search terms included the following 
in various forms: effective assist!, ineffective assist!, Sixth Amendment, Strickland, 
neuro!, brain, fMRI, functional magnetic resonance imaging, MRI, magnetic 
resonance imaging, PET scan, position emission tomography, CAT scan, computer 
axonal tomography, CT scan, EEG, electroencephalogram, SPECT, single-photon 
emission computed tomography, MRA, BEAN, brain fingerprinting, assistance. 
 33. See Appendix for sample. 
 34. In 2013 President Barack Obama, while pledging 100 million dollars towards a 
“BRAIN” project, explained how one of the federal government’s central missions is 
to study the brain at a level more refined than ever before. See B.R.A.I.N. Initiative, 
WHITE HOUSE (April 2, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/infographics/brain-
initiative.  The Royal Society of London has also voiced support for continued study 
and exploration of neuroscience and law. See ROYAL SOC’Y OF LONDON, BRAIN 
WAIVES MODULE 4: NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW, (2011), available at 
http://royalsociety.org/uploadedFiles/Royal_Society_Content/policy/projects/brain-
waves/Brain-Waves-4.pdf. 
 35. For a general overview and analysis of neuroscience’s use in courts, see Susan 
A. Bandes, The Promise and Pitfalls of Neuroscience for Criminal Law and 
Procedure, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 119, 120 (2010) and John H. Blume & Emily C. 
Paavola, Life, Death, and Neuroimaging: The Advantages and Disadvantages of the 
Defense’s Use of Neuroimages in Capital Cases—Lessons from the Front, 62 
MERCER L. REV. 909, 931 (2011). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court and the American Bar Association 
(ABA) have created some standards attorneys can follow to 
determine if their performance is in line with the Sixth Amendment’s 
right to effective assistance of counsel.36  Unfortunately for 
neuroscience evidence, these standards are vague and may be difficult 
to practically apply. 
To search for a standard that can be practically applied, the author 
did a comprehensive case search to attempt to locate all criminal 
cases in the last twenty years where courts found attorneys violated 
the Sixth Amendment for not developing neuroscience evidence.37  
The author then analyzed the over nine hundred cases that resulted 
from the search.  The final case sample consists of seventy-four lower 
court decisions and five U.S. Supreme Court decisions.38  These cases 
serve both as a source of authority for this Note and as a resource 
attorneys can use to help them determine when they must develop 
neuroscience evidence. 
Mr. Perkins’ story is illustrative of many cases where courts have 
found the Sixth Amendment requires attorneys to develop 
neuroscience evidence.39  In his habeas petition, Mr. Perkins made the 
following three ineffective assistance of counsel claims: (1) that he 
was not competent to stand trial, (2) that his attorneys violated his 
                                                                                                                 
 36. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984) (listing the first and 
only framework the U.S. Supreme Court has iterated for analyzing ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims); Criminal Justice Section Archive, AM. BAR ASSOC., 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive.html (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2013) (listing the different Guidelines the American Bar Association’s 
Criminal Justice Section promulgates). 
 37. See Appendix for case sample, although the search undoubtedly does not 
encompass all such cases. 
 38. The author used the electronic legal search database, WestlawNext, to search 
for all criminal cases since April 1, 1992 where courts found attorneys ineffective for 
not developing neuroscience evidence.  The initial case search returned 983 cases.  
The author then read through each case to make sure they belonged in the sample.  
Most of the cases were eliminated because they were either not on point, found the 
attorney effective (instead of ineffective), or found the attorney ineffective for a 
reason unrelated to neuroscience.  After initial analysis, seventy-four cases remained.  
As of March 25, 2013, the author could not find any key cite, head note, ALR or 
similar secondary source on either LexisNexis or WestlawNext that collected cases 
where a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated because his 
attorney failed to develop neuroscience evidence.  Consequently, this case sample 
(contained in Appendix) appears to be one of the first on this topic and should give 
some aid to attorneys seeking to comply with the Sixth Amendment.  Given that 
there are so many courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, that have found and 
continue to find the Sixth Amendment sometimes requires neuroscience evidence, 
this case law analysis is both necessary and overdue. 
 39. See infra Part III.B for an in-depth analysis of how Perkins is similar to other 
ineffective assistance of counsel cases. 
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rights during the guilt phase, and (3) that his attorneys violated his 
rights during the sentencing phase of trial by not developing evidence 
regarding his brain injury even though they knew about the rake 
attack, which severally injured his brain.40 
Like most ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the court 
rejected Mr. Perkins’ first claim for a procedural reason––he did not 
raise it on direct appeal.  Further, the court did not consider Mr. 
Perkins’ second claim asserting his trial attorneys were ineffective 
during the guilt phase of trial.  As in many similar cases, it was only 
the third claim—that trial counsel was ineffective during the 
sentencing phase for not investigating his brain injury—that 
prevailed. 
Like the court in Hall, courts are more likely to find that the Sixth 
Amendment requires counsel to offer neuroscience evidence during 
the sentencing phase, rather than in the guilt phase.41  The guilt phase 
of a trial occurs when the jury determines if a criminal defendant 
committed the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.42  If a 
defendant is found guilty, the sentencing phase affords the jury the 
ability to determine what the punishment will be.43  This may be 
because the Federal Rules of Evidence strictly govern what evidence 
can be admitted during the guilt phase at trial so neuroscience 
evidence may not be admissible at all.44  In contrast, the sentencing 
phase uses a “more is better” approach, and would prefer to let the 
jury see all reasonable available mitigating evidence––that is, any 
evidence that may help them conclude his act was less wrongful or 
evil.45  For example, instances of prior abuse, the defendant’s mental 
health, or prior brain injury may be mitigating evidence.46 
An important caveat is that just because the Sixth Amendment 
requires neuroscience evidence to be developed does not mean that it 
must be used—or is even admissible—at trial.47  The purpose of 
developing this evidence is to inform counsel of possible defenses, 
                                                                                                                 
 40. See Perkins v. Hall, 708 S.E.2d 335,  339 & n.2, 344. (Ga. 2011). 
 41. See infra Part III.B. 
 42. See generally Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of 
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 330–31 (1983). 
 43. See id. at 334–35. 
 44. See Mark Pettit, Jr., FMRI and BF Meet FRE: Brain Imaging and the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 319, 323–27 (2007). 
 45. See id. 
 46. See Sixth Amendment—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
255, 264 (2007). 
 47. See infra Part I.B. 
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even if they choose not to pursue them.48  The scope of what the Sixth 
Amendment requires will be explored in Part II. 
This Note is organized in four interrelated parts.  Part I provides a 
background on the Sixth Amendment’s right to effective assistance of 
counsel.  It briefly describes neuroscience, oppositions to and 
limitations on in its use, and its admissibility in Court.  To guide 
attorneys, Part II provides an overview of the standards the ABA and 
U.S. Supreme Court have developed to explain when attorneys must 
develop neuroscience to be effective.  Part III explains the results of a 
statistical analysis conducted by the author, which helps further 
define when courts already require attorneys to develop neuroscience 
evidence.  Finally, Part IV explains why attorneys need guidance to 
ensure that they are not violating the Sixth Amendment, and expands 
on the ABA Guidelines by proposing a framework attorneys may use 
to determine whether or not they should develop neuroscience 
evidence. 
I.  THE SIXTH AMENDMENT, EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, AND 
NEUROSCIENCE: A PRELIMINARY FRAMEWORK FOR 
UNDERSTANDING COUNSEL’S OBLIGATIONS 
This Part first describes the Sixth Amendment and how courts 
determine if counsel provided their client effective assistance.  It then 
explains what neuroscience is and how it may be presented as 
evidence in a criminal trial. 
A. The Sixth Amendment’s Right to (Effective) Assistance of 
Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees every 
criminal defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel49 for 
two reasons: first, because every criminal defendant has a 
fundamental right to a fair trial,50 and second, because our criminal 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See ABA, American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and 
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, reprinted in 31 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 913, 1017–18 (2003). 
 49. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (“[T]he right to 
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”). 
 50. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984).  See also Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); and Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) for the line of cases that developed this right.  The 
Court originally iterated the right to effective assistance in Powell. 287 U.S. 45, 63.  
Because the Sixth Amendment had not been incorporated to the states at that time, 
this right was based on the Due Process Clause. See id. at 63.  This right is now 
understood as a Sixth Amendment right. See John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, 
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justice system believes a fair trial occurs only if two opposing sides 
forcefully argue against each other.51  If the defense counsel does not 
argue effectively, a resulting conviction may be unjust and is not 
reliable.52 
However, courts disagree on what is or is not effective assistance, 
raising two questions: (1) is it better to promote independent counsel 
that are free to zealously defend their clients, or (2) should counsel 
have more guidance to ensure that counsel meets at least a minimal 
standard of effectiveness?  From these questions, two answers 
emerge: the standard articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Strickland, which asks that counsel merely be “reasonable,” and the 
ABA Guidelines, which further instruct attorneys of specific 
obligations. 
1. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Delineated Framework: Strickland v. 
Washington 
In 1984, Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Strickland v. 
Washington was the first and only time the U.S. Supreme Court 
articulated a specific standard courts must follow to determine if an 
attorney provided effective assistance under the Sixth Amendment.53  
A Florida judge sentenced Charles Strickland to death for a series of 
three separate brutal murders and stabbings.54  Mr. Strickland’s 
counsel neither presented any character witnesses at sentencing, nor 
did he request a psychiatric examination or meet with any of Mr. 
Strickland’s family to develop mitigating evidence.55  Defense counsel 
decided not to investigate these areas due to “reasonable professional 
judgment”––because a prior psychiatric report had not revealed any 
                                                                                                                 
“It’s Like Deja Vu All Over Again”: Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla 
v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guidelines Approach to the Effective 
Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 131 (2007) (citing United States v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223–38 (1967)). 
 51. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685 (explaining how our system of criminal justice 
relies on an adversarial system). 
 52. See id. (citing Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275, 276 
(1942)) (noting that effective defense counsel is fundamental to our adversarial 
system because “access to counsel’s skill and knowledge is necessary to accord 
defendants the ‘ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution’ to which they 
are entitled”). 
 53. Id. at 683 (“[T]he Court has never directly and fully addressed a claim of 
‘actual ineffectiveness’ of counsel’s assistance in a case going to trial.”). 
 54. See id. at 671 (detailing the charged murders); Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d 
658 (Fla. 1978). 
 55. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 673. 
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“major mental illness.”56  Instead of pursuing a mental health defense, 
counsel decided to focus on extreme emotional disturbance and 
Strickland’s willingness to take responsibility for the crime.57  The 
Court found counsel was effective because their performance was 
“reasonabl[e] under prevailing professional norms” and even if, 
arguendo, there was an error, Mr. Strickland was not prejudiced by 
it.58 
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Strickland requires a 
criminal defendant to prove two things: (1) that his counsel’s 
performance was deficient, and (2) that he was prejudiced by this 
deficiency.59  If both elements are met, the criminal defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights were violated and he is entitled to either an 
entirely new trial or a new sentencing depending on where the 
deficiency occurred.60 
a. Deficient Performance 
An attorney’s performance is deficient if, based on what they knew 
or should have known at the time,61 their acts were not reasonable 
“under prevailing professional norms.”62  At a minimum, attorneys 
must investigate the case so they can make “informed choice[s] 
among possible defenses.”63  While this duty to investigate “is limited 
to a reasonable investigation,”64 it does require investigating the 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Id. at 699, 676. 
 57. Id. at 673–74. 
 58. Id. at 699. 
 59. Id. at 687.  A court may determine there was not prejudice without first 
examining if the attorney’s performance was deficient. Id. at 697. 
 60. Id. at 687.  This standard makes proving ineffective assistance—in any 
circumstance—a high bar to reach.  For example, the court in Berry v. King found no 
ineffective assistance of counsel, even if counsel used drugs during trial because 
“under Strickland the fact that an attorney used drugs is not, in and of itself, relevant 
to an ineffective assistance claim.” 765 F.2d 451, 454 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 61. See Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Effectiveness 
must be judged as of the time the legal services were rendered so as to minimize the 
distortions of hindsight.”). 
 62. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 511 (2003). 
 63. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 511 (2003); see also Ard v. Catoe, 642 S.E.2d 590, 597 
(S.C. 2007) (“[W]ithout a doubt . . . ‘[a] defense attorney has a duty to investigate.’” 
(quoting Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F.2d 1447, 1450 (11th Cir. 1986))); accord 
Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 37 (2009). See generally ABA, ABA STANDARDS 
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 
1993), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/ 
criminal_justice_standards/prosecution_defense_function.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 64. See Thompson, 787 F.2d at 1450 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691); Ard, 642 
S.E.2d at 597 (quoting Thompson, 787 F.2d at 1450). 
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client’s background65––specifically in capital cases where 
“professional norms require counsel to conduct a thorough 
investigation into ‘all reasonably available mitigating evidence’”66––
and may sometimes require expert consultations.67 
However, the Strickland Court was concerned that a set standard 
of rules that attorney’s must follow in all cases could interfere with an 
attorney’s constitutionally protected independence.68  Thus, a 
reasonable investigation does not “require counsel to investigate 
every conceivable line of mitigating evidence.”69  Counsel can even 
decide not to investigate certain options if it results from a strategic 
choice––that is, an informed, reasoned decision that is supported by 
“reasonable professional judgment.”70  For instance, as discussed in 
Strickland, it was permissible for counsel to decide to stop 
investigating Mr. Strickland’s mental health because a prior 
psychiatric report did not reveal any “major mental illness”—a 
decision that was informed and supported by “reasonable 
professional judgment.”71 
In Justice O’Connor’s words, “counsel has a duty to make 
reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that 
makes particular investigations unnecessary.”72  As courts are 
extremely deferential to counsel’s strategic decisions, an 
unreasonable investigation is only found in extremely egregious 
circumstances.73  Unfortunately, in neuroscience cases, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has encountered an increasing number of such 
egregious cases, as explored in Part II. 
                                                                                                                 
 65. See Elmore v. Ozmint, 661 F.3d 783, 857 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 691). 
 66. Post-Hearing Brief at 24, Stone v. South Carolina, 655 S.E.2d 487 (S.C. 2007) 
(No. 08-CP-43-905) (citing Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524). 
 67. See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011). 
 68. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
 69. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 533; see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 
(2005) (“[T]he duty to investigate does not force defense lawyers to scour the globe 
on the off chance something will turn up; reasonably diligent counsel may draw a line 
when they have good reason to think further investigation would be a waste.”). 
 70. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  However, counsel cannot justify an 
incomplete investigation for fear that it would not reveal mitigating information or 
because the client does not want counsel to collect mitigating evidence. See Hamblin 
v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482, 492 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 71. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 676. 
 72. See id. at 691. 
 73. See supra note 62 for an illustrative example. 
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b. Actual Prejudice 
The client must also be prejudiced by counsel’s deficient 
performance.74  Prejudice occurs when there is “substantial 
likelihood” that the defendant’s trial’s result would have been 
different but for the counsel’s unprofessional act.75  For many 
proceedings, it is enough to show that “at least one juror would have 
struck a different balance.”76  In capital cases the court must weigh 
aggravating factors (factors that make a crime more wrong) with the 
“totality of available mitigating evidence” (factors that make a crime 
less wrong).77  Because prejudice is rarely proven, counsel’s deficient 
performance is often merely regarded as a harmless error.78 
2. The ABA’s Guidelines: Expanding on Strickland to Further 
Explain Sixth Amendment Requirements 
 Justice Marshall explained in his Strickland dissent that “[t]o 
tell lawyers and the lower courts that counsel for a criminal defendant 
must behave ‘reasonably’ and must act like ‘a reasonably competent 
attorney’ is to tell them almost nothing.”79  To give clearer guidance 
to counsel and to create uniformity in lower courts,80 the ABA 
                                                                                                                 
 74. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also Sears v. Upton, 130 S. Ct. 3259, 3264 
(2010); United States v. Kurti, 427 F.3d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 2005); State v. Salazar, 707 
P.2d 944 (Ariz. 1985); accord Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148, 1185 (10th Cir. 
2012); Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397 (3rd Cir. 2011); Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 
1064, 1083 (10th Cir. 2008); Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1258 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(all finding the client was actually prejudiced by their defense counsel’s deficient 
performance). 
 75. See Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 38–39 (2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 694) (finding prejudice if there is a “reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”) (emphasis added); accord Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012); Cullen 
v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011).  This likelihood must be substantial, not just 
conceivable, see Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 792 (2011), and cannot assume 
a fact finder would have disregarded the law, see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. 
 76. See Porter, 558 U.S. at 41; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537 (2003); Von 
Dohlen v. State, 602 S.E.2d 738, 743 (S.C. 2004). 
 77. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534. 
 78. See supra note 60 for an illustrative example.  For an analysis of the Strickland 
Standard to better understand why so many ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
do not succeed, see Blume & Neumann, supra note 49, at 129. 
 79. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 707–08 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 80. For example, Guideline § 1.1(A) states, “The objective of these Guidelines is 
to set forth a national standard of practice for the defense of capital cases in order to 
ensure high quality legal representation for all persons facing the possible imposition 
or execution of a death sentence by any jurisdiction.” ABA, supra note 48, at 919.  
These Guidelines were also made in response to a number of statistical studies 
regarding defense representation conducted by the federal government. See, e.g., 
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promulgated a set of Guidelines (ABA Guidelines) that list specific 
obligations lawyers owe to their clients.81  The ABA Guidelines cover 
many topics and include instructions for defense attorneys in many 
different situations and cases.82  Part II when, according to the 
Guidelines, the Sixth Amendment requires counsel to develop 
neuroscience evidence.  The Next Part explains what neuroscience is 
for the purposes of this Note. 
B. What Is Neuroscience? 
For purposes of this Note, neuroscience refers to the science of 
“how the brain enables mental activity.”83  While neuroscience has 
existed in its present form since roughly the 1950s, historians and 
scholars have viewed the human brain as the center of intellect and 
decision-making,84 and have studied the nexus between the human 
                                                                                                                 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NATIONAL CRIMINAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS STUDY 
(1986) available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/94702NCJRS.pdf; 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE FOR THE POOR, 1986 
(1988); NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: FINAL SURVEY 
RESULTS FOR PUBLIC DEFENDERS (1990). 
 81. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 475 F.2d 943, 954–56 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
(asserting the standard for effective assistance should follow the ABA Guidelines). 
See generally ABA, supra note 63.  For example, counsel has a duty to “conduct 
appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to determine what matters of 
defense can be developed.” United States v. Decoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 
1973).  As then-Chief Judge Bazelon of the D.C. Circuit articulated, ABA Guidelines 
are merely “a starting point for the court to develop, on a case by case basis, clearer 
guidelines for courts and for lawyers as to the meaning of effective assistance.” Id. at 
1203 n.23.  Judge Bazelon’s view was that ineffective assistance of counsel would 
follow a guideline approach, such as that articulated in the ABA Guidelines. See id. 
at 1203, aff’d on reh’g en banc, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also United States 
v. Decoster (Decoster III), 624 F.2d 196, 276 (Bazelon, J., dissenting), cited in Blume 
& Neumann, supra note 50, at 133. 
 82. See, e.g., ABA, supra note 63; ABA, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE (3d ed. 1992); ABA House of Delegates Resolution 
8C (adopted Feb. 5, 2002). 
 83. See MARK GRAVES, MIND, BRAIN AND THE ELUSIVE SOUL 18 (2008).  
Neuroscience is broader than this definition allowed and would include “all sciences 
studying the nervous system and brain.” Id.  Technically, this paper is concerned 
merely with cognitive neuroscience. Id. 
 84. Alcmaen, born in 535 B.C.E., is thought to be the first to realize intellect was 
located in the brain, an idea that was then developed by Hippocrates, the father of 
modern medicine, Galen, and then Descartes. See 13 LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE: 
CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 1 (Michael Freeman ed., 2011) [hereinafter LAW AND 
NEUROSCIENCE].  Throughout history, there has been a struggle between 
“materialist” views of human behavior and immaterial views. See Amanda C. 
Pustilnik, Violence on the Brain: A Critique of Neuroscience in Criminal Law, 44 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 183, 190 (2009).  Trying to find the source of criminality 
within the material human brain represents a new acceptance of a materialist view. 
See id. 
2013] A FAIR TRIAL 191 
brain and crime for over two hundred years.85  In the twenty-first 
century, uncovering what is contained in the human brain has become 
not only a mission for doctors, academics, and scholars, but also a 
central mission of the federal government.86  Thus, as neuroscience 
advances, the connection, or lack thereof, between the human brain 
and crime may become more known, and, consequently, 
neuroscience’s presence in our nation’s criminal courtrooms may 
become ubiquitous. 
1. Neuroscience Evidence Is Currently Used in Criminal Courts 
As of today, rightly or wrongly, neuroscience is already used in the 
criminal justice system and courts have found it probative in many 
areas of criminal law.87  The court in State v. Appacrombie, for 
instance, allowed the defense to introduce an electroencephalogram, 
neuropsychological evaluation, and testimony by neurologist into 
evidence.88   This evidence helped show that the defendant was unable 
to appreciate the consequences of her crime when she shot at two 
teenagers, killing one.89  The evidence revealed how, prior to the 
crime, the defendant underwent a surgery to remove part of the 
temporal lobe of her brain to help her with a seizure disorder,90 and 
that after the surgery she became more violent, angry, and paranoid 
without provocation.91 
In some instances, like in Appacrombie, neuroscience may tell us 
how or why someone may have acted in a given situation.92   For 
                                                                                                                 
 85. See Pustilnik, supra note 84, at 191. (“[T]heories of the causes of violence and 
of ways to identify and deal with people who may be prone to violence historically 
have exerted tremendous pull over many criminal law scholars and practitioners.”).  
Today we are back in a time where human thoughts and behaviors are localized in a 
material place. See id. 
 86. See supra Part I. 
 87. See Blume & Paavola, supra note 35, at 910 (citing Margaret Talbot, Duped: 
Can Brain Scans Uncover Lies?, NEW YORKER, July 2, 2007, at 52); Jonathan H. 
Marks, Interrogational Neuroimaging in Counterterrorism: A “No Brainer” or a 
Human Rights Hazard?, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 483 (2007) (discussing neuroscience and 
terrorism); Jennifer Wild, Brain Imaging Ready to Detect Terrorist, Say 
Neuroscientists, 437 NATURE 457, 457 (2005) (same)). 
 88. State v. Appacrombie, 766 So. 2d 771, 776 (La. Ct. App. 2000).  For a detailed 
description of EEGs and their current use in the criminal justice system, see infra 
note 124 and accompanying text. 
 89. See Appacrombie, 766 So. 2d at 766. 
 90. See id. at 774. 
 91. See id. (noting how she became paranoid by, for example, believing her family 
was doing “voodoo” against her). 
 92. See Adam Lamparello, Using Cognitive Neuroscience to Predict Future 
Dangerousness, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 481, 495–96 (2011).   There are many 
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example, in Evans v. Secretary of the Department of Corrections, the 
defendant shot and killed his brother’s girlfriend because she was 
unfaithful.93  The Eleventh Circuit held that testimony by three 
experts should have been admitted during the sentencing phase of 
trial to testify about the defendant’s brain damage.94 The court 
reasoned this damage caused him to act impulsively, limited his ability 
to “appreciate the criminality of his conduct,” and would help explain 
why he killed her so impulsively.95 
Neuroscience may also reveal if a defendant was able to form the 
requisite premeditation or other mental state the government must 
prove as part of the charged crime.96  In Bean v. Calderon the 
defendant asserted, and the Ninth Circuit agreed, that the defendant’s 
brain damage and drug use together prevented him from being able 
to form the requisite intent to kill necessary to support a first-degree 
murder charge.97  Further, in Smith v. Dretke, an expert submitted an 
affidavit stating the defendant likely suffered from organic brain 
damage, which prevented him from understanding the difference 
between right and wrong.98  In agreement, the Eleventh Circuit issued 
a certificate of appealability.99 
Neuroscience evidence has been used at every stage of legal 
proceedings, including pre-trial competency, suppression hearings, 
culpability, and sentencing.100  It can also be used for direct appeals 
                                                                                                                 
other ways neuroscience evidence may assist a criminal defense.  For example, 
neuroscience has already been used in courts in order to downgrade the level of 
crime the defendant is charged with, to show the crime was not a voluntary act, to 
argue the defendant is not competent to stand trial, and by the prosecution to show 
the victim’s injuries. See generally Deborah W. Denno, Book Synopsis: Changing 
Law’s Mind: How Neuroscience Can Help Us Punish Criminals More Fairly and 
Effectively (Aug. 15, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1909958##.  Neuroscience evidence may also show a client 
lacks impulse control, has a mental disease or defect, or has general cognitive defects. 
See generally id. 
 93. Evans v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 681 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th Cir. 2012) reh’g en 
banc granted, opinion vacated, 686 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2012) and on reh’g en banc, 
703 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2742 (2013). 
 94. Id. at 1270 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 95. Id. at 1247. 
 96. See O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital 
Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 1292 (2007). 
 97. Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1081 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining how the 
defendant claims his “mental impairments, coupled with his habitual use of PCP, 
incapacitated him from forming the requisite intent for the crimes with which he was 
charged”). 
 98. Smith v. Dretke, 422 F.3d 269, 283 n.5 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 99. Id. at 289. 
 100. See Appendix. 
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and in support of habeas petitions and can, in theory, be introduced 
by any party.101 
2. Opposition: What Is Special About Scientific Evidence? 
Some opponents argue that neuroscience evidence should not be 
used because it could not bear on any material fact in a criminal 
case.102  Some assert that neuroscience cannot be probative because, it 
is difficult to connect man-made crime with biology103 and that, 
because humans have free will, their biology does not influence their 
behavior.104  Further, some opponents assert neuroscience evidence 
may not be reliable because it sometimes depends on information the 
defendant—who is likely biased—reports about himself.105  This Note 
does not seek to disprove these valid points.  Rather, it seeks to 
explain how the Sixth Amendment already requires attorneys to use 
neuroscience evidence and to give guidelines on how to meet 
constitutional requirements.  These criticisms are not dispositive, 
however, because they also apply to many other types of already 
admissible evidence.  Further they are aimed at more than simply 
neuroscience––scientific evidence in general is often subject to 
criticism by opponents who either doubt its probative value or fear 
the evidence’s impact may lead to injustice.  While unreliable, 
misleading science exists, so does unreliable witness testimony and 
identification techniques.  Other evidence can supposedly be made 
                                                                                                                 
 101. Although this Note is not concerned with neuroscience evidence used by the 
prosecution, as it would not give rise to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this 
Note takes the stance that this evidence will be exclusively used by defense attorneys 
because the rules of evidence would bar any use by the prosecution, see Fed. R. Evid. 
403–04.  Except, of course, if the prosecution were introducing a brain scan to show 
the complainant’s injuries, see id. 
 102. See Sarah Ryan, Can Neuroscience Enhance Justice?, YALE L. SCH. LILLIAN 
GOLDMAN L. LIBR. (Mar. 11, 2013), http://library.law.yale.edu/news/can-neuroscience 
-enhance-justice. 
 103. See id. (“Culturally constructed crimes cannot be mapped onto neural 
substrates.”). 
 104. See Theodore Y. Blumoff, How (Some) Criminals are Made, in LAW AND 
NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 84, at 171, 184–89 (arguing that neuroscience can 
influence a criminal’s act without undermining free will, while providing a general 
overview of the philosophical arguments against this notion); see also Walter 
Glannon, What Neuroscience Can (and Cannot) Tell Us about Criminal 
Responsibility, in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 84, at 13, 17–18. 
 105. Commentators warn that these reports should not be used because the client, 
facing possible criminal penalties, has a motive to mislead. See Marc J. Tasse, 
Adaptive Behavior Assessment and the Diagnosis of Mental Retardation in Capital 
Cases, 16 APPLIED NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 114, 119 (2009) (“Relying solely on the 
individual’s self-report is fraught with problems.”). 
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more truthful through techniques like cross-examination, so the 
question arises: why should science be treated differently?  Scientific 
evidence’s unique criticism may simply be a reaction to historical 
realities. 
Today, scientific knowledge is tested, peer-reviewed, and 
safeguarded.  However, like law, scientific standards are a product of 
history and policy.  For much of human history, science was limited to 
2000-year-old untested, non-replicated ideas that, at their inception, 
were no more than hunches.106  The few privileged people who 
possessed scientific knowledge had an unwarranted ability to 
persuade and a history of abuse.107  For much of history, modern ideas 
of scientific ethics and even science as a separate discipline did not 
exist.108  Many empirical standards––like verification, experiments by 
systematic observation, and result replication––were not adopted as 
worldwide standards until at least the 1920s.109  Given science’s 
history, philosophers and common law courts may have been wise to 
limit its legal use. 
Today, however, we are dealing with a much different world.  Most 
neuroscience—and certainly any science that the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and its state counterparts will allow into court—derives 
from studies of direct observation, reviewable results, replication, and 
peer-review.  Thus, many historical justifications for barring science 
from the courtroom may not be applicable today.  These historical 
justifications do serve as reminders that courts should be ever vigilant 
to make sure the science they admit is trustworthy (as with all types of 
evidence). 
C. What Exactly Is “Neuroscience Evidence”? 
“Neuroscience evidence” comes in many forms, but generally falls 
in two broad categories: first, computer images of a human’s brain, 
                                                                                                                 
 106. For example, fifth century philosopher Leucippus’s conception of the atom, 
based solely on his personal reasoning, was relied on in building more scientific 
theories even though it was not based on observational experiment or verified by a 
microscope. 
 107. PAOLO ROSSI, FRANCIS BACON: FROM MAGIC TO SCIENCE 32 (2013). 
 108. Until the nineteenth century, scientific numeral arts were indistinguishable 
from social liberal arts.  Even when they divided, many scientific disciplines were not 
considered distinct, requiring many scientists to be generalist.  Without distinct 
disciplines, it becomes very hard to develop the standards of reliability and validity 
necessary to differentiate the well-founded from the folly. 
 109. Many of these ideas had not entered into scientific discourse at all until the 
1920s to 1940s with the Logical Positivism movement promulgated by the Vienna 
Circle. 
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called brain scans; and second, tests that a mental health professional 
gives a person to determine how their brain works, called 
neuroscience evaluations.110  Experts who rely on neuroscience 
evidence to form their expert opinions may bring this evidence with 
them while testifying in a criminal case.111  When an expert testifies, 
they may show the jury the neuroscience evidence and explain what 
they believe it means.112 
1. Brain Scans 
One category of neuroscience evidence is computer images called 
brain scans.  These images show either how the brain functions or its 
structure.113 
a. Function: Reveals the Living Brain 
Functional brain scans are computer images of a person’s brain 
that show how his brain works by tracking how blood flows through 
the brain.114  This “allow[s] living brains to be observed, both as their 
shape changes over time and as they function,” to show what part of a 
person’s brain is used when they do particular tasks, such as moving, 
thinking, or experiencing sensation or emotion.115  Thus, this may 
show if a brain functions abnormally.116 
There are a few kinds of functional brain scans.  Functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is considered the “gold standard 
of behavioral neuroscientific imaging” because it produces an image 
                                                                                                                 
 110. See Blume & Paavola, supra note 35, at 911–14. 
 111. See James S. Walker & William Bernet, Neuroscience & Legal Proceedings, 
in THE ORIGINS OF ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 237, 
238 (Christopher R. Thomas & Kayla Pope eds., 2012); see also Blume & Paavola, 
supra note 35, at 914–915. 
 112. See Walker & Bernet, supra note 111, at 238. 
 113. See Abram S. Barth, A Double-Edged Sword: The Role of Neuroimaging in 
Federal Capital Sentencing, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 501, 503 (2007). 
 114. See Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through A Scanner Darkly: Functional 
Neuroimaging As Evidence of A Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States, 62 STAN. 
L. REV. 1119, 1127 (2010); Pettit, supra note 44, at 320.  The premise behind 
functional neuroimaging is that when a part of the brain is working, blood and sugar 
will flow to that part of the brain. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., 
UNDERSTANDING THE BRAIN: THE BIRTH OF A LEARNING SCIENCE 189 (2007). 
Researches have relied on this premise to cure neurological diseases and perform 
cognitive research. See VICTORIA SHERROW, MEDICAL IMAGING 92 (2007) 
(describing the impact functional scans, including PET scans, have had in the 
diagnosis and treatment of neurological diseases like Alzheimer’s). 
 115. Blume & Paavola, supra note 35, at 913 (citing Henry T. Greely, Neuroethics 
and ELSI: Similarities and Differences, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 599, 612 (2006)). 
 116. See id. 
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with a higher resolution than any other brain scan.117  Medically, 
neurosurgeons use the scans to localize tumors and track Alzheimer’s 
progression.118  It can cost a few thousand dollars in addition to the 
cost of an expert to both interpret it and possibly testify at trial. 
Other kinds of brain scans used in courts are positron emission 
tomography scans (PET)119 and single-photon emission computed 
tomography scans (SPECT).120  Medically, PET and SPECT scans are 
good for identifying seizures.121  One drawback from using them in 
court is that the results may be manipulated, and possibly 
unreliable.122  SPECT scans cost less than PET scans, but may be less 
useful because the images they produce have a lower resolution.123 
Another form of neuroscience evidence used in courts is the 
electroencephalogram (EEG).124  Rather than producing an “image” 
                                                                                                                 
 117. See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & Eric J. Laury, Toward A Neuroscience Model 
of Tort Law: How Functional Neuroimaging Will Transform Tort Doctrine, 13 
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 235, 239 (2012) (“[I]mage[s] generated by fMRI [are] 
superior, both spatially and temporally, to the images produced by PET and SPECT 
scans.”); Neal Feigenson, Brain Activity During Simulated Deception: An Event-
Related Functional Magnetic Resonance Study, 15 NEUROIMAGE 727 (2002). 
 118. See Brown & Murphy, supra note 114, at 1127–28.  For an overview of 
extensive cognitive neuroscience research using fMRI, see, e.g., Feroze B. Mohamed 
et al., Brain Mapping of Deception and Truth Telling About an Ecologically Valid 
Situation: Functional MR Imaging and Polygraph Investigation—Initial Experience, 
238 RADIOLOGY 679 (2006). 
 119. See Barth, supra note 113, at 503.  PET scans track the metabolic rate by 
injecting a radioactive substance that binds to the sugary glucose in the brain. See 
THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC PUBLISHING TEXTBOOK OF NEUROPSYCHIATRY AND 
BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 772 (Stuart C. Yudofsky & Robert E. Hales eds., 
2008).  It then uses an x-ray type machine to track the radioactive substance to see 
where the blood and sugar flows when the patient does certain tasks. See Pettit, supra 
note 44, at 320. 
 120. See Brickford Brown & Samuel Tarry, Does Your Pet Bite?  The 
Misapplication of Brain Scans in Toxic Tort Litigation, FOR THE DEFENSE, Mar. 1997, 
reprinted in CENTER FOR COGNITIVE LIBERTY & ETHICS, http://www.cognitiveliberty. 
org/neuro/pet_bite.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2013).  For examples of brain scans used 
in courts see People v. Holt, 937 P.2d 213 (Cal. 1997), for PET scans and 
Commonwealth v. Yancy, 797 N.E.2d 371 (Mass. 2003), for SPECT scans. 
 121. See Walker & Bernet, supra note 111, at 240–41; see also supra Part I.A.2. 
 122. See Walker & Bernet, supra note 111. 
 123. See Pettit, supra note 44, at 320. 
 124. See Barth, supra note 113, at 503 (citing Jessie A. Seiden, The Criminal Brain: 
Frontal Lobe Dysfunction Evidence in Capital Proceedings, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 395, 402 
(2004)); Snead, supra note 96, at 1290.  Like the other methods, EEG is widely used 
in the clinical context and in medicine to, for example, determine brain death and 
communicate with the comatose. See generally 5 ATTORNEYS MEDICAL ADVISOR § 
40:45 (2013); FUNDAMENTAL NEUROSCIENCE 1389 (Michael Zigmond et al. eds., 
1999); Kai Keng Ang et al., A Large Clinical Study on the Ability of Stroke Patients 
to Use an EEG-Based Motor Imagery Brain-Computer Interface, CLINICAL EEG & 
NEUROSCIENCE, Oct. 2011.  For example, it could tell if one can become comatose or 
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of the brain, like fMRI, PET, and SPECT scans, this technique 
measures the brain’s electrical activity.125  Medically, this procedure 
measures brains thousands of times each day to diagnose brain states 
like seizures or metabolic disorders.126  Further, EEGs are often 
affordable, sometimes costing merely a couple hundred dollars.127 
b. Structure: Anatomical Structure 
There are also brain scans that show what the brain’s structure 
looks like.  One scan commonly used in hospital emergency rooms is 
a computer tomography (CT) scan.  A CT scan is basically a series of 
x-rays that when placed together can create a 3D image.128  Thousands 
of CT scans are taken each day for medical purposes.129  Medically, 
CTs are particularly useful for identifying strokes and brain lesions.130  
A fair market value for the scan is approximately $700 without 
insurance.131 
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) has largely replaced CT scans 
because it provides a far higher resolution,132 albeit at a higher cost.133  
                                                                                                                 
will get a seizure when under the influence of alcohol. See Berryman v. Ayers, No. 
1:05 CV 05309 AWI, 2007 WL 1991049, at *15–19 (E.D. Cal. July 10, 2007) (defense 
counsel’s expert argued that an EEG showed that the client could not have 
committed rape without having a seizure).  In addition to the scans—fMRI, PET, and 
SPECT––there are a few more types of tests that can be administered that this note 
will not generally address because they are not generally used in court. See Denno, 
supra note 92.  For example, brain fingerprinting which uses EEGs to determine if a 
memory is accurate and Brain Electrical Activity Mapping (BEAM). See ZILLMER ET 
AL., PRINCIPLES OF NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 43 (2nd ed. 2008) (describing BEAM scans); 
Pettit, supra note 44, at 321. 
 125. See Snead, supra note 96, at 1282–83. 
 126. See Walker & Bernet, supra note 111. 
 127. See EEG, HEALTHCARE BLUE BOOK, http://healthcarebluebook.com/page_ 
Results.aspx?id=205&dataset=MD (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) (estimating the fair 
market price of an EEG to be $254). 
 128. See Keith A. Johnson, Neuroimaging Primer, WHOLE BRAIN ATLAS, http:// 
www.med.harvard.edu/AANLIB/hms1.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2013). 
 129. See Walker & Bernet, supra note 111, at 240. 
 130. See id. at 239. 
 131. See Brain CT (With and Without Contrast), HEALTHCARE BLUE BOOK, 
http://healthcarebluebook.com/page_Results.aspx?id=205&dataset=MD (last visited 
Oct. 24, 2013) (estimating the fair market price of an CT scan to be $895, including 
both the scan and physician interpretation). 
 132. See generally Silvia A. Bunge & Itamar Kahn, Cognition, Neuroimaging, in 
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEUROSCIENCE (George Adelman & Barry H. Smith eds., 
Elsevier B.V. CD-ROM, 3d ed. 2004) (citing Snead, supra note 96, at 1281) 
(explaining that the MRI had replaced the CT because it is so detailed that it possible 
to differentiate gray matter from white matter with the naked eye). 
198 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLI 
Unlike the CT, which uses x-rays, the MRI produces a detailed image 
of the brain’s anatomical structure by lining up magnets on either side 
of the head134 and “measuring the signal strengths of the various radio 
frequencies emitted by the proton nuclei of atoms in brain tissue.”135  
Medically, MRIs are particularly suited to measure brain 
abnormalities such as the presence of tumors, contusions, or 
dementia.136  They cost a little under $1000.137 
Because each type of brain scan captures slightly different pieces of 
information, neuroscientists recommend using more than one type of 
brain scan on a patient, increasing the accuracy of any resulting 
diagnosis.138 
c. Limitations 
While brain scans may reveal brain damage or other abnormalities, 
there are a number of limitations.  First, because brain scans do not 
speak for themselves, an expert must explain to the jury what they 
mean.139  Thus, it is possible for experts to disagree or to misinterpret 
the findings.140  They may also be influenced by bias, or have a motive 
to mislead.141   The very fact that this risk exists may lead to prolonged 
“battle of the experts” cases where each side argues for different 
interpretations of a scan.142  What is worse, jurors and judges may not 
realize how subjective interpretations of these scans are and may 
commit errors in reasoning as a result.143  Second, a person’s brain and 
his environment work together to form his behavior—the brain alone 
is not determinative.144  So, for example, a fully functioning “normal” 
                                                                                                                 
 133. See J.T. Lindsay Wilson & Peter Mathew, SPECT in Head Injury, in SPECT 
IMAGING OF THE BRAIN 69, 69 (Roderick Duncan ed., 1997) (noting MRI scans are 
“slower and more expensive than CT” scans). 
 134. See Walker & Bernet, supra note 111, at 240. 
 135. Snead, supra note 96, at 1281; see also Eggen & Laury, supra note 117, at 241. 
 136. See Walker & Bernet, supra note 111, at 240. 
 137. See Brain CT (With and Without Contrast), supra note 131 (estimating the 
fair market price of an MRI scan to be $895, including both the scan and physician 
interpretation). 
 138. See Moritz F. Kircher et al., A Brain Tumor Molecular Imaging Strategy 
Using A New Triple-Modality MRI-Photoacoustic-Raman Nanoparticle, 18 NATURE 
MED. 829 (2012). 
 139. See Blume & Paavola, supra note 35, at 925–30. 
 140. See id. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. at 927. 
 144. See Barbra Bradley Hagerty, A Neuroscientist Uncovers A Dark Secret, NPR 
(June 29, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127888976. 
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person may have a brain that looks the same as a sociopath’s.145  For 
instance, a brain scan revealed that a University of California-Irvine 
Neuroscientist, James Fallon, has a brain that looks like a killer’s, 
although there is no evidence that he is a serial killer.146  Third, a 
“normal” brain scan does not in any way mean a person is free from 
brain damage—there are many possible brain abnormalities that 
brain scans cannot detect.147 
2. Neuroscience Evaluations 
Brain disorders and abnormalities can also be detected without 
using brain scans.  Neuroscience evaluations are tests given by mental 
health professionals.148  These tests measure psychological functions 
“known to be linked to a particular brain structure or pathway.”149  
Such functions include: attention and concentration; visual perception 
and reasoning; memory; learning; verbal functions; academic skills; 
construction; concept formation; self-regulation and motor ability; 
and emotional status.150  Medically, a neuroscience evaluation is a 
well-accepted tool to identify brain abnormalities such as brain 
lesions.151  An evaluation costs from three to four thousand dollars, 
depending on the test.152 
Other examinations may include: unstructured interviews with the 
defendant, his or her acquaintances, or family members; review of a 
defendant’s medical, social, and academic history; and a physical 
examination.153  Scholars argue neuroscience evaluations should be 
conducted before any brain imaging is done because they may 
provide more reliable evidence of brain abnormalities and are more 
economically feasible.154 
An important qualifier to remember is that all neuroscience 
evidence is just that—evidence.  Like all evidence, it is only one part 
                                                                                                                 
 145. See id. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See Blume & Paavola, supra note 35, at 927. 
 148. See id. at 912. 
 149. See id. at 911. 
 150. See id. See generally BERNARD J. ALPERS & ELLIOTT L. MANCALL, 
ESSENTIALS OF THE NEUROLOGICAL EXAMINATION 1–32 (4th ed. 1975) (describing 
in detail the neuropsychological testing process). 
 151. See Walker & Bernet, supra note 111, at 244. 
 152. See Parent’s Guide to the Pediatric Neuropsychological Assessment, CENTER 
FOR NEUROPSYCHOLOGY & COUNSELING, http://thecenterinwarrington.com/Parents 
__Guide_to_NP_Eva.html (last visited May 9, 2013). 
 153. See ALPERS & MANCALL, supra note 150, at 1–32. 
 154. See Blume & Paavola, supra note 35, at 910. 
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of the picture.  It should be considered alongside other background 
information such as the environment one grew up in or other life 
experiences.155  Thus, many cases that use neuroscience evidence 
admit other evidence of the defendant’s background that are 
mitigating, like prior abuse.156 
In sum, neuroscience evidence may enter criminal courtrooms in 
many forms.  It may enter through expert testimony, through the 
results of a neuroscience evaluation, or even as an actual picture of 
the human brain.157  Each type of neuroscience evidence has unique 
advantages and disadvantages when used in criminal courtrooms.  For 
clarity, the remainder of this Note will collectively refer to all of these 
types as “neuroscience evidence.” 
D. Admissibility of Neuroscience Evidence 
The admissibility of neuroscience evidence is governed by each 
jurisdiction’s rules of evidence and case law.158  While the Sixth 
Amendment may still require attorneys to develop neuroscience 
evidence that is not admissible at trial, whether the evidence could be 
admitted is a factor courts consider.159 Federal Rules of Evidence 
(FRE) 702–06 and relevant state counterparts govern all scientific 
evidence, including neuroscience evidence.160  Experts may also 
present neuroscience evidence in court by relying on the evidence 
during their testimony. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 determines what scientific testimony 
is permissible at trial and considers facts such as whether the evidence 
is accepted in the relevant medical community or is otherwise highly 
reliable.161  Neuroscience evidence does not always meet this test.162  
                                                                                                                 
 155. See Hagerty, supra note 144. 
 156. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 392 (2005) (holding that the Sixth 
Amendment required the defense attorney to utilize to investigate his client’s 
neurological and mental heath while crafting the defense case theory, but also ruling 
that evidence of the defendant’s extremely abusive childhood should have been 
admitted). 
 157. See, e.g., Hernandez-Alberto v. State, 889 So. 2d 721, 727 (Fla. 2004) 
(admitting a neuroscience evaluation and testimony of five experts, and granting 
defense attorney’s motion to admit a PET scan of the defendant’s brain in order to 
determine if the defendant was competent to stand trial). 
 158. See Walker & Bernet, supra note 111, at 238. 
 159. See BRIAN R. MEANS, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 35:6 (2013). 
 160. See Walker & Bernet, supra note 111, at 238; see also FED. R. EVID. 702–06. 
 161. FED. R. EVID. 702; see also FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
 162. See, e.g., People v. Brooks, No. A124664, 2011 WL 5979668, at *1 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Nov. 30, 2011), review denied, (Feb. 29, 2012) (finding a SPECT scan 
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In People v. Hix, an expert was prepared to testify that a SPECT scan 
showed the defendant suffered from a brain abnormality, namely, a 
dysfunction in his frontal and temporal lobes.163  The trial court did 
not allow this testimony because it determined that SPECT scans are 
not accepted in the relevant medical community as a means to 
diagnose brain abnormalities.164  However, this rule is not uniform.  
For instance, the court in Briscoe v. Scribner allowed an expert to 
testify that a SPECT scan can show the defendant suffered from a 
brain abnormality.165 
The Federal Rules of Evidence may also limit the conclusions 
experts can reach.  In federal cases, for instance, an expert is 
prohibited from presenting an opinion about whether or not a 
criminal defendant possesses a certain mental state if it is an element 
of the crime.166  Some, but not all, states have similar prohibitions.167  
When neuroscience evidence is admitted to argue the defendant 
could not form intent to kill, for example, the conclusion is 
inadmissible.168 
Both the Federal Rules of Evidence and their state counterparts 
are stricter during the guilt phase of trial than during the sentencing 
phase.169  Neuroscience evidence, like many other types of scientific 
                                                                                                                 
inadmissible because it was not shown to be accepted in the relevant medical 
community). 
 162. See People v. Hix, No. B203884, 2009 WL 242318, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 
2009) 
 163. See id. 
 164. Id. at *8.  (“SPECT scans are generally accepted in the scientific community 
of neurology to diagnose Alzheimer’s disease, stroke, and epilepsy, they are not 
generally accepted in the scientific community to diagnose brain injuries or mental 
disorders such as schizophrenia or depression.  Appellant does not cite to, nor have 
we found, California cases holding that SPECT scans are generally accepted to 
diagnose schizophrenia or brain damage negating appellant’s intent to kill or proving 
that he was insane at the time he committed the crime.”). 
 164. See Briscoe v. Scribner, No. CIV S-04-2175 FCD GGH P., 2010 WL 1525695, 
at *52–53 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2010). 
 165. See id. 
 166. See FED. R. EVID. 704(b) (“In a criminal case, an expert witness must not state 
an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or 
condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense.”).  The 
fear is that instead of aiding the jury in their decision, it will usurp the jury of their 
fact-finding power. See id. (“Those matters are for the trier of fact alone.”). 
 167. See, e.g., MD. R. EVID. 5-704. 
 168. State v. Appacrombie, 766 So. 2d 771, 775–76 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (admitting 
evidence of defendant lobotomy to argue she could not form intent to kill requisite 
for a second degree murder charge). 
 169. See Pustilnik, supra note 84, at 185 (“[N]euroscience evidence primarily has 
been offered by the defense in mitigation at sentencing.”).  Further, in capital cases, 
jurors are allowed to see all reasonably available mitigating evidence because they 
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evidence, is more likely to be admitted during the sentencing phase of 
trial.170  Therefore, the Sixth Amendment is more likely to require 
attorneys to develop neuroscience evidence when they prepare the 
sentencing argument.171 
II.  DELINEATED STANDARDS: WHEN THE ABA AND 
STRICKLAND REQUIRE COUNSEL TO DEVELOP NEUROSCIENCE 
EVIDENCE IN THEIR BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION 
This Part explores when the Sixth Amendment compels attorneys 
to develop neuroscience evidence.  First, it addresses when Strickland 
would require attorneys to develop such evidence, and then it 
explains how the ABA Guidelines have expanded on Strickland. 
A. The ABA Guidelines: Attorneys Must Develop Neuroscience 
Evidence in Some Cases 
The ABA Guidelines assert that defense counsel must investigate 
if their client suffers from brain damage or other mental health 
concerns.172  The Guidelines draw a strong dividing line between non-
capital cases (where effective defense counsel may sometimes use 
neuroscience) and capital cases (where neuroscience must always be 
investigated).173 
In non-capital cases, the ABA Guidelines recognize that it may be 
necessary for counsel to develop neuroscience evidence.174  It states 
                                                                                                                 
are deciding whether this person’s crime is so wrong, is so evil, that only death can 
bring justice.  When making this decision, the criminal justice system believes jurors 
should be given all information that may lessen the crime’s ultimate wrongfulness so 
their decision will be as fully informed as possible.  If a criminal defendant suffers 
from brain damage, this background information might be important for the jury to 
know.  If they did not know, they may mistakenly believe a crime was solely caused 
by a defendant’s evil wrongful character, not a mental disease. 
 170. See id. 
 171. See Appendix. 
 172. See ABA, supra note 48, at 1021. 
 173. Currently, most states require lawyers to provide legal services professionally 
and ethically in line with the ABA Guidelines for capital cases. See id. at 938 (“[A]ny 
jurisdiction wishing to impose a death sentence must at minimum provide 
representation that comports with these Guidelines.”); accord Richard P. Mauro, The 
Chilling Effect That the Threat of Sanctions Can Have on Effective Representation 
in Capital Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 417, 424–25 (2007).  Many lower courts also 
cite the ABA Guidelines when determining if counsel’s reasonable investigation 
should have included neuroscience evidence. See, e.g., Summerlin v. Schriro, 427 F.3d 
623, 629–30 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 174. See generally Mental Health, A.B.A. 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_st
andards_mentalhealth_blk.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) (outlining standards 
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the defense attorney’s “legal representation plan should provide for 
investigatory, expert, and other services” at all phases of trial if they 
are “necessary to quality legal representation.”175  Thus, if 
neuroscience is necessary for a defense, counsel must seek experts to 
help develop it.176 
In capital cases, counsel must always investigate to see if there is 
neuroscience evidence available to help their client, because brain 
damage is common among capital defendants.177  As the ABA 
Guidelines explain, “With respect to the guilt/innocence phase, 
defense counsel must independently investigate the circumstances of 
the crime and all evidence––whether testimonial, forensic, or 
otherwise––purporting to inculpate the client.”178  Counsel must 
“subject[] all forensic evidence to rigorous independent scrutiny,” and 
“investigate and present mitigating evidence.”179  As the comments to 
Guideline 4.1 explain, “Counsel must compile extensive historical 
data, as well as obtain a thorough physical and neurological 
examination. Diagnostic studies, neuropsychological testing, 
appropriate brain scans, blood tests or genetic studies, and 
consultation with additional mental health specialists may also be 
necessary.”180 
The Guidelines recognize that neuroscience evidence, while 
potentially expensive, is absolutely necessary because it is so highly 
probative in many areas of a criminal proceeding.181  The commentary 
for Guideline 10.7 explains that counsel also has a duty to explore 
“[m]edical history,” including “mental and physical illness or 
injury . . . and neurological damage”; family history, including “family 
history of mental illness, cognitive impairments”; “special educational 
                                                                                                                 
mental heath professionals must adhere to when testifying on behalf of a defendant, 
including disclosure requirements). 
 175. See ABA, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE 
SERVICES 5-1.4 (3d ed. 1992), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/providing_defense_services.authche
ckdam.pdf. 
 176. See id. 
 177. See ABA, supra note 48, at 956, 959. See generally Craig Haney, The Social 
Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and the Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 547, 559–83 (1995). 
 178. See ABA, supra note 48, at 926. 
 179. Id. at 926, 1021. 
 180. Id. at 956 (emphasis added). 
 181. They recognize the importance of mental health in many stages of a 
proceeding, including the initial competency, mental health when the offence 
occurred, ability to form intent, understanding of Miranda warnings, and ability to 
waive constitutional rights. See id. 
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needs (including cognitive limitations and learning disabilities)”; and 
service in the military, including “health and mental health services” 
received.182 
Moreover, counsel must speak with the client as soon as possible to 
develop records of his or her mental health.183  Records can have “a 
wealth of mitigating evidence, documenting or providing clues to 
childhood abuse, retardation, brain damage, and/or mental illness.”184  
Further, they must interview the defendant’s family members and 
others who know the family such as neighbors and parole officers.185  
It is necessary to interview non-family members in case the family 
suffers from impairments similar to the client’s.186 
Thus, under the ABA Guidelines approach, neuroscience evidence 
should be a real part of counsel’s reasonable investigation, and, 
specifically in capital cases, defense counsel may be ineffective for 
failing to comply with this duty.187 
B. When the Strickland Standard Requires Attorneys to 
Develop Neuroscience Evidence 
The Strickland standard does not specify when neuroscience or 
other mental health evidence must be developed because the 
approach does not approve of “mechanical rules” regarding what is or 
is not effective assistance.188  After Strickland, the U.S. Supreme 
Court did not find a single attorney ineffective for over sixteen 
years.189  This means the Court provided no guidance for all kinds of 
evidence––not just neuroscience evidence.190  Three years after 
Strickland, Justice Marshall expressed concern over how little the 
                                                                                                                 
 182. Id. at 1022–23. 
 183. See generally id. at 1024–26. 
 184. Id. at 1024. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See id. 
 187. See id. at 1025. 
 188. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984).  The Court explicitly 
rejected the ABA Approach, stating that ABA Guidelines “are guides to 
determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides.” Id. at 688.  Relying too 
much on guidelines would “interfere with the constitutionally protected 
independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making 
tactical decisions.  Indeed, the existence of detailed guidelines for representation 
could distract counsel from the overriding mission of vigorous advocacy of the 
defendant’s cause.” Id. at 689. 
 189. See Blume & Neumann, supra note 50, at 134. 
 190. For further discussions on how the unclear Strickland standard leaves courts 
without guidance for all kinds of evidence, see id. at 134. 
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standard has done to protect the accused.191  He warned that unless 
the Court put teeth into Strickland, the Court will “permit the lower 
courts to conclude that the Sixth Amendment guarantees no more 
than that ‘a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial 
alongside the accused’––a notion expressly disavowed in 
Strickland.”192  It took the Court thirteen years to apply Strickland 
with more force, in a decision that arguably was only facially decided 
under Strickland.193  During the U.S. Supreme Court’s silence, several 
lower courts provided attorneys with somewhat contradictory 
guidance about when the Sixth Amendment requires them to develop 
neuroscience evidence.194 
One common thread between the decisions, however, is that 
attorneys who violated their client’s Sixth Amendment rights, often 
did little to no investigation or preparation in many areas of the case.  
For instance, the defendants in Glenn v. Tate and Skipper v. Lee are 
quite similar.195  Both were placed into special education classes in 
school, had low IQs, and had previously undergone mental health 
counseling.196  Both had suffered from severe organic brain damage 
since childhood.197 
However, the defense attorney in Glenn failed to discover the 
defendant’s organic brain damage because he did not attempt to 
construct a social history of Glenn and did not interview family 
members or review school records that would have revealed the brain 
damage.198  Because counsel did not know of the brain damage, he did 
not present it during the guilt or sentencing phases of trial.199  In 
contrast, the defense attorney in Skipper did a background 
investigation into the defendant’s social history, interviewed his 
                                                                                                                 
 191. See generally Mitchell v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 1026 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(lamenting how the standard iterated in Strickland may not an adequate safeguard 
for the criminally accused). 
 192. Id. (quoting Strickland, 446 U.S. at 685). 
 193. See Blume & Neumann, supra note 50, at 135. 
 194. For more cases finding ineffective assistance for failure to introduce 
neuroscience evidence under the Strickland Standard, see, for example, Coleman v. 
Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2001); Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 
1997); Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204 (6th Cir. 1995); Loyd v. Whitley, 977 F.2d 149 (5th 
Cir. 1992); People v. Morgan, 719 N.E.2d 681 (Ill. 1999); and People v. Ruiz, 686 
N.E.2d 574 (Ill. 1997). 
 195. See Skipper v. Lee, 238 F.3d 414, 415 (4th Cir. 2000); Glenn, 71 F.3d at 1208–
11. 
 196. See Skipper, 238 F.3d at 415; Glenn, 71 F.3d at 1208. 
 197. See Skipper, 238 F.3d at 415; Glenn, 71 F.3d at 1207. 
 198. See Glenn, 71 F.3d at 1208–11. 
 199. See id. at 1207. 
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family members, and consequently set up a psychological evaluation 
of his client and discovered the brain damage.200  While the defense 
attorney in Skipper chose not to present information about his client’s 
brain damage at the guilt phase, he did present it at sentencing.201  The 
court found that defense counsel in Glenn violated his client’s Sixth 
Amendment rights, whereas the court in Skipper determined defense 
counsel provided his client with adequate representation.202 
It seems clear that attorneys must do some type of background 
investigation and that if they do so properly, they will likely comport 
with the Sixth Amendment.  But given that defense attorneys do not 
have unlimited time nor the financial resources to intensely 
investigate each client, and that not all defendants actually suffer 
from brain damage, how thorough should the investigation be?  
Unfortunately, Strickland does not provide guidance about what—
precisely—is expected.  For example, does a defense attorney need to 
develop neuroscience evidence in every case?  If not, how can we tell 
when it is or is not required? 
In addition to not developing neuroscience evidence, counsel could 
fail to provide adequate representation under the Constitution by 
failing to prepare for trial at all.  For example, the defendant in 
Wallace v. Stewart brutally beat and killed his girlfriend and her three 
children one-by-one as they returned home.203  The defense attorney 
spent only thirty-six minutes preparing the psychological expert in the 
case and he did not provide the expert with the results of a 
personality test that a court appointed psychologist performed on the 
defendant to determine if he was competent.204  Likewise, in Bean v. 
Calderon, defense counsel knew his client suffered from organic brain 
damage as well as other serious mental impairments,205 yet he failed to 
give two experts who were testifying in the case the documentation 
necessary for them to testify that the client suffered from brain 
damage.206  As a result, the expert could not definitively conclude that 
                                                                                                                 
 200. See Skipper, 238 F.3d at 415. 
 201. See id. 
 202. See id.; Glenn, 71 F.3d at 1205; see also Loyd v. Whitley, 977 F.2d 149, 157–58 
(5th Cir. 1992) (adopting the trial courts factual determination and affirming their 
decision that counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel because defense 
counsel “simply failed to develop independent psychiatric evidence of mental disease 
or defect in a death case where this line of investigation was clearly indicated”). 
 203. Wallace v. Stewart, 184 F.3d 1112, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 204. Id. at 1115–16. 
 205. Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 206. See id. at 1078–79.  During post-conviction proceedings, one of the experts 
testified that the defendant “exhibited substantial physical, mental, and emotional 
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the defendant had brain damage or that he could “appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct.”  Instead the expert could “merely testify 
that Bean suffered from an organic personality disorder and was 
moderately defective in intelligence.”207 
In most of these lower court cases, the attorney’s incompetence 
was based on a lack of general common sense.  For instance, in 
Buenoano, the defense attorney merely interviewed an expert 
psychologist during the lunch break before trial and did not provide 
the psychologist with any mental health information,208 including 
details about the defendant being physically and sexually abused 
growing up as well as information about the defendant’s grandiose 
delusions, such as insisting that she was working towards her PhD and 
MD when she was not.209 
Unfortunately, earlier lower court decisions often left mentally 
impaired defendants little constitutional recourse, and gave 
inadequate instruction to lawyers hoping to satisfy their Sixth 
Amendment duties.210  As the ABA Guidelines explain, “Under the 
standards set out by the U.S. Supreme Court for reviewing claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, even seriously deficient performance 
all too rarely leads to reversal.”211 
III.  CASE ANALYSIS: RECENT COURT DECISIONS (SOMETIMES) 
REQUIRE ATTORNEYS TO DEVELOP NEUROSCIENCE EVIDENCE 
This Part reviews results of the case study conducted by the author.  
First, it explains the case analysis’ background; second, it explores 
common elements between cases; and third, it reviews the results of 
the case search and goes over some “red flags” attorneys should look 
for to more adequately protect a criminal defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights. 
                                                                                                                 
impairments that were relevant to each of the . . . sentencing factors in mitigation.” 
Id. at 1079. 
 207. Id. at 1078. 
 208. See Buenoano v. Singletary, 963 F.2d 1433, 1438 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 209. Id. at 1037–38. 
 210. See Blume & Neumann, supra note 50, at 131. 
 211. ABA, supra note 48, at 930; see also William S. Geimer, A Decade of 
Strickland’s Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 
4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 94 (1995) (“Strickland has been roundly and properly 
criticized for fostering tolerance of abysmal lawyering.”); Kim Taylor-Thompson, 
Tuning Up Gideon’s Trumpet, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1461, 1465 (2003) (“[T]he ruling 
has proved disabling to the right to effective assistance of counsel in practice.”). 
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A. Case Law Analysis 
Since Strickland, some U.S. Supreme Court Justices have voiced 
concern over the quality of legal representation, specifically in capital 
cases.212  Justice O’Connor—who wrote the majority decision in 
Strickland—noted, “Perhaps it’s time to look at minimum standards 
for appointed counsel in death cases.”213  These concerns have found 
their way into a string of U.S. Supreme Court rulings finding defense 
attorneys ineffective for not developing some type of mental health or 
neuroscience evidence about their client.214 
This seemingly significant change in U.S. Supreme Court 
jurisprudence is further bolstered because the opinions withstood the 
stringent standard of review outlined in the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which will permit habeas 
review when the lower court’s decision violated “clearly established 
Federal law.”215  Thus, this group of U.S. Supreme Court opinions 
assert that it is “clearly established law” that, in some cases, the Sixth 
Amendment requires defense attorneys to present arguments based 
on neuroscience.216  These decisions shift effective assistance 
jurisprudence to a less deferential approach that treats the ABA 
Guidelines as a minimum “standard of professional norms.”217 
                                                                                                                 
 212. Justice Ginsberg noted that “people who are well represented at trial do not 
get the death penalty,” and Justice O’Connor noted that the court “may well be 
allowing some innocent defendants to be executed.” ABA, supra note 48, at 929 
(citing Anne Gearan, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Supports Death Penalty 
Moratorium, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 10, 2001). 
 213. Id. 
 214. See Sears v. Upton, 130 S. Ct. 3259 (2010); Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 
(2009); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 
(2003). 
 215. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012); see also Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 380; Wiggins, 539 
U.S. at 520 (applying the statute). 
 216. See § 2254 (noting that the Court can only review a state court judgment 
clashing with a clearly established law). 
 217. See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524 (“Counsel’s conduct 
similarly fell short of the standards for capital defense work articulated by the [ABA] 
standards to which we long have referred as ‘guides to determining what is 
reasonable.’” (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 588, 688 (1984))).  As the 
Sixth Circuit said in a startling departure from a prior Strickland-oriented approach, 
“American Bar Association standards have long been considered guides to the 
reasonableness of counsel’s conduct.” Haliym v. Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680, 716–17 (6th 
Cir. 2007).  Many lower court cases now treat the ABA Guidelines as a standard of 
“professional norms.” See, e.g., Littlejohn v. Trammell, 704 F.3d 817, 859 (10th Cir. 
2013).  This charge is particularly pronounced in cases where defense counsel fails to 
introduce evidence about their clients based on neuroscience. See, e.g., Sinisterra v. 
United States, 600 F.3d 900, 908 (8th Cir. 2010); Young v. Sirmons, 551 F.3d 942, 957 
(10th Cir. 2008); Smith v. Dretke, 422 F.3d 269, 279 (5th Cir. 2005). 
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Given that the Sixth Amendment sometimes requires defense 
attorneys to present neuroscience evidence, the author hoped to 
review case law to develop a guideline attorneys could use to ensure 
compliance with the Sixth Amendment.218  Unfortunately, very few 
bright line rules in current case law specify when the Sixth 
Amendment requires defense attorneys to develop neuroscience 
evidence.  For example, in Perkins, Mr. Perkins did not want to be 
evaluated by an expert, and insisted that his counsel not develop 
evidence of his mental health or abuse background.219  The fact that 
Mr. Perkins literally fired one of his defense attorneys for trying to 
interview jail personnel about his mental heath was immaterial 
because the Sixth Amendment required counsel to develop 
neuroscience evidence regardless of Perkins’ wishes.220  In contrast, 
the court in State v. Fautenberry, found counsel did not violate their 
client’s Sixth Amendment rights when they failed to discover his 
brain injury because Mr. Fautenberry said he did not want to meet 
with a psychologist to be evaluated.221 
B. Results: Common Characteristics 
These decisions spurred courts across the nation to hold that the 
Sixth Amendment may require effective counsel to develop 
neuroscience evidence of their client in capital cases.222  These cases 
do not follow the Strickland or ABA Guideline standards, but rather 
follow a kind of quasi-ABA approach.223 
Many of these decisions have much in common with Perkins.  First, 
like Mr. Perkins, the defendant is often charged with first-degree 
murder.  In all five U.S. Supreme Court cases, and in seventy of the 
seventy-four lower court cases identified, the client was charged with 
first-degree murder.  Second, a jury eventually sentenced Mr. Perkins 
to death.224  In all U.S. Supreme Court cases and the vast majority of 
                                                                                                                 
 218. See Appendix for cases and descriptions. 
 219. See supra Introduction. 
 220. See supra Introduction. 
 221. See State v. Fautenberry, No. C-971017, 1998 WL 906395, at *4 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Dec. 31, 1998). 
 222. See Appendix for example cases. 
 223. No court has held, as the ABA Guidelines provide, that neuroscience must be 
used in all capital cases.  These recent developments retain Strickland’s “strong 
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance.” JOSEPH R. SIMPSON, NEUROIMAGING IN FORENSIC 
PSYCHIATRY: FROM THE CLINIC TO THE COURTROOM 269 (2012). 
 224. See Perkins v. Hall, 708 S.E.2d 335, 338 (2011); see also supra Part I for 
further discussion of Mr. Perkins’s case. 
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lower court cases analyzed, the client was eventually given the death 
penalty. 
Third, the neuroscience evidence could have been used in many 
different stages of the case.  In Perkins, neuroscience evidence—
evidence of his brain injury—could have been useful during the 
competency, guilt, and sentencing phases of his trial.  Like Perkins, in 
these cases counsel should have developed evidence for many stages 
of a criminal trial, although the most common stage was during the 
sentencing phase.  Lastly, Mr. Perkins suffered not only from brain 
injury, but also from prior physical and sexual abuse.225  Many cases 
where the Sixth Amendment requires counsel to develop 
neuroscience evidence also require defense attorneys to investigate 
other kinds of evidence—like evidence of an abusive childhood. 
C. Results: Duty to Investigate Red Flags 
The Sixth Amendment is the basis for an attorney’s independent 
duty to take specific affirmative steps to determine if their client 
suffers from brain damage.226  For instance, in Correll v. Ryan, 
defense counsel’s investigation consisted of open-endedly asking the 
defendant and his family to provide him with any information that 
would help with the defense.227  He did not ask for any specific 
information about the client’s “drug abuse, head injury, psychiatric 
history, or family dysfunction.”228  The Ninth Circuit found that 
ineffective assistance of counsel “resulted from counsel’s complete 
failure to ask any relevant questions”––interviewing witness and 
reading records alone, without asking pointed, specific questions 
aimed at uncovering red flags was not sufficient.229  Likewise, in 
Ferrell v. Hall, counsel only asked about “statutory mitigation 
factors,” and neglected to follow-up on any information that did not 
                                                                                                                 
 225. As the introduction of this Note explains, Mr. Perkins was physically abused 
by his father and sexually assaulted by a neighbor when he was a child. See Perkins, 
708 S.E.2d at 342; supra Part I.  Like many courts, the Georgia Supreme Court in 
Perkins also asserted that the defense attorneys should have also explored evidence 
of this abuse. See Perkins, 708 S.E.2d at 343–44. 
 226. See, e.g., Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1250, 1254–55 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(finding counsel ineffective when he knew defendant, the son of a farmer, had an 
“extraordinary history of exposure to pesticides and toxic chemicals, yet he neither 
investigated fully this history nor informed the experts who examined Caro of those 
facts that were known to him”). 
 227. 539 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 228. Id. at 945. 
 229. Id. 
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portray the defendant in a positive light.230  This investigation was 
found unreasonable because it failed to uncover a wealth of 
information, including that the capital defendant had a very low IQ, 
suffered from hallucinations since he was a child, and had organic 
brain dysfunction in his frontal lobe.231 
However, there are some factors, or “red flags,” that should put a 
reasonable attorney on notice that neuroscience evidence may need 
to be developed.  A red flag is some factor, such as a head injury or 
serious substance abuse, which may indicate brain damage, a brain 
abnormality, or another mental impairment.  Case law shows that 
failure to obtain neuroscience evidence is most likely to raise a red 
flag if it is one of many errors or oversights counsel has made.232 
D. Red Flags 
Below are some “red flags” that commonly give rise to a duty for 
counsel to investigate further for neuroscience evidence. 
1. Head Injury 
State233 and federal234 criminal courts, of all levels––the U.S. 
Supreme Court,235 federal circuit courts,236 and state county courts––
                                                                                                                 
 230. 640 F.3d 1199, 1216 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 231. Id. at 1211–13.  One of the experts said that if he had been given information 
about the defendant’s head injury and hallucinations, he would have recommended 
further neuroscience evaluation. See id. at 1220.  Indeed, testing done for post-
conviction proceedings revealed the defendant suffered from “frontal lobe 
dysfunction,” and “temporal lobe epilepsy” attributable to his head injury. Id. at 
1213.  The expert “explained that individuals with frontal lobe dysfunction display 
impaired insight and learning abilities, are more prone to impulsive and explosive 
behaviors, and are more prone towards affective instability, meaning a dysfunctional 
emotional or mental state.” Id. at 1213.  Again, a jury gave the defendant a death 
sentence without knowing any of this highly important mitigation evidence.  See id. at 
1199. 
 232. See SIMPSON, supra note 223, at 269. 
 233. See, e.g., Coleman v. State, 64 So. 3d 1210, 1218 (Fla. 2011). 
 234. See, e.g., Stallings v. Bagley, 561 F. Supp. 2d 821, 877 (N.D. Ohio 2008) 
(finding ineffective assistance when counsel failed to follow up even though they 
knew their client suffered a head injury as a child); see also Loyd v. Whitley, 977 F.2d 
149, 156 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 235. See, e.g., Sears v. Upton, 130 S. Ct. 3259, 3261 (2010) (finding defense counsel 
ineffective for failing to follow up despite knowledge that their client suffered 
significant damage to his frontal lobe as a child). 
 236. All circuit courts have also treated prior head injury as a red flag counsel must 
inquire about, and once known, must investigate further for brain abnormalities. See, 
e.g., Sinisterra v. United States, 600 F.3d 900, 905, 907 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding 
ineffective assistance when counsel knew defendant suffered head injury but did not 
follow up with further testing when further testing may have uncovered that 
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have found that head injury is highly indicative of neurological 
damage and have deemed counsel ineffective for not investigating 
possible brain abnormalities.237  For instance, the defendant in 
Frierson  suffered a serious head injury that resulted in four days of 
hospitalization and impaired vision for over two years.238  Although 
his defense attorney consulted medical records and knew of the 
accident, he did not consult with a neurologist about the effects of the 
defendant’s head trauma—had he done so, he would have discovered 
that the defendant’s low IQ was due to the fall.239 
Although learning of a client’s prior head injury may give an 
attorney a duty to investigate further, attorneys may have an 
independent duty to develop evidence of a head injury.240  Such 
evidence of head injury may be obtained through interviews with 
their client, his family, or by surveying pertinent records.241  For 
example, in Blystone v. Horn, defense counsel was ineffective 
because he did not develop and review records from when the client 
                                                                                                                 
defendant likely suffered from brain damage); Frierson v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982, 
990 (9th Cir. 2006) (ineffective when counsel failed to investigate when defendant’s 
school records revealed he suffered head injury and, consequently, had a low IQ); 
Pizzuto v. Arave, 385 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2004) (Fletcher, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (finding ineffective assistance when defense counsel knew 
defendant “sustained serious head injuries from falling down a flight of stairs at the 
age of two and from a bicycle accident when he was a teenager” and failed to inform 
psychiatric expert testifying in the case); Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1251, 1256 
(9th Cir. 2002) (finding counsel ineffective for failing to follow up despite that their 
was likely “brain damage caused by head injury, exposure to toxic pesticides and the 
combination of both factors”). 
 237. See Richard E. Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and 
Legal Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 51, 58 (2006) (“[E]ven 
mild head injuries can cause frontal lobe damage.”); see also Appendix for a list of 
forty-five cases where counsel was found ineffective for failing to investigate when 
they either knew their client suffered a traumatic head injury or would have learned 
by doing a proper investigation. 
 238. See Frierson, 463 F.3d at 990. 
 239. See id. 
 240. See, e.g., Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 422 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 241. For example, in Turpin v. Lipham, a capital case, defense counsel did curate 
2500 pages of records about the defendant to the jury to collect mitigation evidence 
even though “[t]rial counsel knew they had a client who had been institutionalized in 
mental hospitals, children’s homes, and treatment centers for nine years.” 510 S.E.2d 
32, 41–42 (Ga. 1998).  A reasonable investigation would have uncovered evidence 
that the defendant “had been subjected to, or diagnosed with, chronic poverty, 
physical abuse, alcoholic parents, severe neglect, isolation from his family, severe 
behavioral problems, conduct disorders, anxiety disorders, a possible learning 
disability, inadequate socialization, head injuries, and a wide disparity between his 
performance IQ and his verbal IQ.” Id.  Without this information, a blinded jury 
sentenced him to death. See id. 
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was incarcerated in Maryland and was enlisted in the Navy.242  A 
review of these records would have revealed that the defendant 
suffered from a head injury at age four that, according to one of the 
defense experts, caused the defendant brain damage.243  Likewise, in 
State v. Pearce, a capital case, defense counsel did a minimal 
investigation for mitigating information––he never even contacted 
any of the defendant’s family members.244  The court found counsel 
ineffective because if he had contacted family members, it would have 
uncovered a wealth of mitigating information including that Pearce 
“fell down the stairs as a baby, received head injuries when he fell out 
of a truck, and was diagnosed with dyslexia that he possibly received 
from a brain injury.”245 
2. Low Intellectual Functioning 
Courts have also found that low intellectual functioning indicates 
the kind of brain damage that effective counsel must develop as part 
of a reasonable investigation.246  Counsel may also have a duty to 
determine a client’s IQ, specifically if it is contained in the 
defendant’s records.247  For example, in Hamblin v. Mitchell, counsel’s 
investigation was considered unreasonable because he failed to 
review school records that would have revealed this capital defendant 
was not educated above the seventh grade and had a low IQ.248  It was 
immaterial that the resulting investigation did not reveal cognitive 
impairment because counsel’s duty was only to investigate.249  Low 
intellectual functioning as a red flag may manifest in a poor academic 
                                                                                                                 
 242. 664 F.3d at 422. 
 243. See id. at 407 n.5. 
 244. 994 So. 2d 1094, 1100–01 (Fla. 2008). 
 245. Id. at 1101–02. 
 246. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 301, 322 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that 
an investigation that did not reveal the defendant had an IQ of seventy-three was 
unreasonable); see also Hernandez v. Martel, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 
2011) (noting low intellectual function may be an “indicator[] that petitioner is 
neuropsychiatrically impaired”). 
 247. See Goodwin, 632 F.3d at 321–22 (concluding counsel’s investigation was 
unreasonable because counsel failed to review the defendant’s “education records 
includ[ing] a psychological report prepared in January 1989, when Goodwin was 
fourteen. The report indicated that Goodwin had an IQ of seventy-three”). 
 248. Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482, 490 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 249. See id. at 492. 
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history, such as failing or repeating grades,250 history of special 
education,251 or a low IQ.252 
3. Serious Substance Abuse 
Serious substance or alcohol abuse may exacerbate existing brain 
abnormalities.253  This is especially true when the defendant began 
using the drug at a young age and the substance correlates highly with 
brain damage, such as crack cocaine use.254  Further, parental or other 
family members’ use of drugs or alcohol may indicate possible brain 
damage in the defendant, such as those who suffered from fetal 
alcohol syndrome.255  This red flag in particular is likely associated 
with other social factors that could be specifically mitigating.  For 
example, often if a defendant is a drug addict and their parents were 
                                                                                                                 
 250. See Hernandez, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1059 (finding ineffective assistance when 
counsel failed to investigate despite client’s “rather rock-bottom scholastic 
performance starting at first grade”). 
 251. See, e.g., Simmons v. State, 105 So. 3d 475, 508 (Fla. 2012), reh’g denied, (Jan. 
7, 2013) (finding an unreasonable investigation when “trial counsel had available 
material showing that Simmons had low intelligence, was in special education and 
classes for the emotionally handicapped in school, dropped out of school early, and 
suffered the loss of oxygen to his brain as a toddler” but failed to investigate further); 
see also Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 942–44 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel after counsel failed to investigate client’s background and 
present mitigating evidence of mental impairment, traumatic background, and brain 
injury––the fact that defendant attended special education classes in high school 
should have lead counsel to investigate further). 
 252. See, e.g., Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975, 1009 (Fla. 2009) (finding an 
unreasonable investigation when counsel did not investigate further, including 
reading “records [that] would have shown that Hurst had a low IQ, was in special 
education classes, and dropped out of school after repeating tenth grade”). 
 253. See Redding, supra note 237, at 58 (“Substance abuse, relatively common 
among those who sustain traumatic brain injury, exacerbates the degree of brain 
damage.”); see also Harold V. Hall, Criminal-Forensic Neuropsychology of Disorders 
of Executive Functions, in DISORDERS OF EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS: CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL LAW APPLICATIONS 37, 65 (Harold V. Hall & Robert J. Sbordone eds., 
1998). 
 254. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 88 So. 3d 128, 138–39 (Fla. 2012) (finding counsel 
ineffective for not investigating defendant’s history of serious substance abuse. The 
evidence was extremely mitigating given that the defendant was using drugs daily at 
eleven years old with his family, and used crack cocaine and LSD—highly damaging 
illicit substances). But see Smith v. Quarterman, 515 F.3d 392, 404–05 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(rejecting argument that “mere knowledge of his prolonged substance abuse should 
have prompted trial counsel to evaluate his cognitive functions and test for organic 
brain damage”). 
 255. See, e.g., Hurst, 18 So. 3d at 1008, 1011 (Fla. 2009) (finding that defense 
counsel’s investigation was unreasonable because he failed to present evidence of 
defendant’s “organic brain damage based on fetal alcohol syndrome”—highly 
mitigating evidence that “could have provided the jury with a basis to recommend 
life”). 
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as well, he may have grown up a victim of other related sexual or 
physical abuse, and thus had associated traumatic childhood 
experiences.256  For example, a history of homelessness may be 
associated with both childhood drug abuse and childhood neglect—all 
of which may be highly mitigating to a jury, especially in death 
penalty cases.257 
Not only can substance abuse cause brain damage, but it may also 
be a form of self-medication for people with mental impairments.258  
As such, under the quasi-ABA standard, a reasonable investigation 
may require counsel to investigate further if a client suffers from 
serious substance abuse. 
4. Childhood Abuse 
Prior childhood abuse can also be a strong mitigating factor for a 
jury to consider and is all too common among criminal defendants.259  
Severe physical or sexual abuse may help explain to a jury why the 
client committed the crime, specifically if the facts of abuse are 
similar to the charged offense.  For example, in Rompilla v. Beard,260 
the capital defendant’s “father locked [him] and his brother Richard 
in a small wire mesh dog pen that was filthy and excrement filled . . . . 
They had no indoor plumbing in the house, he slept in the attic with 
no heat, and the children were not given clothes.”261  Counsel were 
ineffective because they did not present the jury with any of this 
mitigating information when the court sentenced him to death.262   
The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately found counsel violated his client’s 
Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel, and reversed.263 
                                                                                                                 
 256. See, e.g., Coleman v. State, 64 So. 3d 1210, 1218 (Fla. 2011) (finding 
ineffective assistance when counsel failed to uncover the client’s serious substance 
abuse.  Defendant also had a poor relationship with his father, and was subjected to 
physical and sexual abuse as a child). 
 257. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Martel, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1048 (C.D. Cal. 2011) 
(finding the counsel’s investigation unreasonable when they failed to discover that at 
the time of the offense the defendant was “homeless, isolated from his family, drug 
addicted and living in a van”). 
 258. See, e.g., Correll v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Correll began 
experimenting with alcohol and drugs around age ten.  He was using marijuana, LSD, 
and amphetamines regularly by age twelve, behavior that can be characterized as 
self-medication for the everyday trauma of his life and for the mental health illnesses 
that were later diagnosed when he became a ward of the state.” (emphasis added)). 
 259. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390–92 (2005). 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 392. 
 262. Id. at 393. 
 263. Id. at 376. 
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IV.  PROPOSED FRAMEWORK: A “REASONABLE INVESTIGATION” 
SHOULD INCLUDE INVESTIGATING A DEFENDANT’S MENTAL 
HEALTH BACKGROUND, AND, IF NECESSARY, DEVELOPING 
NEUROSCIENCE EVIDENCE 
This Part first advocates for a model that will guide attorneys in 
determining when the Sixth Amendment compels them to develop 
neuroscience evidence.  It then proposes a framework attorneys can 
follow to determine––at a minimum––if their performance may not be 
in line with the Sixth Amendment.  This framework is further 
developed by applying it to Mr. Perkins’ case, which aims to show 
that if his attorneys had followed the proposed framework, they might 
not have violated Mr. Perkins’ Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel.264 
A. Attorneys Need More Specific Instructions to Determine if 
Neuroscience Evidence is Required 
There is a practical and legal need for clear standards that 
attorneys can follow to ensure they are in line with the Sixth 
Amendment while still giving their clients the effective representation 
they are entitled to.265  This need is especially strong when 
neuroscience evidence is required because many attorneys may not 
have a working understanding of neuroscience.  While it may be 
counterintuitive for an attorney to seek out a client’s brain scan, for 
example, to provide effective assistance under the Sixth Amendment, 
this act may be necessary.266  Consequently, no matter how unfamiliar 
or counterintuitive neuroscience may be, it is a real part of a client’s 
background and may need to be explored as part of a reasonable 
investigation.267 
Current sources of legal authority––such as the ABA Guidelines, 
the U.S. Supreme Court, and other case law––neither clearly explains 
when lawyers must develop neuroscience evidence nor describes what 
evidence must be developed.268  The following framework aims to 
expand on these sources, specifically the ABA Guidelines, in order to 
                                                                                                                 
 264. See Perkins v. Hall, 708 S.E.2d 335, 342–44 (Ga. 2011); see also supra notes 1–
10 and accompanying text (providing background information about David Aaron 
Perkins). 
 265. See supra Part II.B. 
 266. See supra Part II. 
 267. See supra Part II. 
 268. See supra Parts II, III and accompanying notes (explaining the differing 
standards used by the ABA, relevant Supreme Court cases, and lower court 
decisions). 
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further instruct attorneys about when the Sixth Amendment does or 
does not require the development of neuroscience evidence. 
B. Proposed Framework to Satisfy Sixth Amendment 
Requirements 
This Note’s proposed framework consists of three parts.  First, 
criminal defense attorneys should conduct an initial interview; 
second, they should do a thorough background investigation; and 
third, they should take further action if certain red flags are 
uncovered through either their interview, background investigation, 
or other sources.269  The type of crime the client is charged with and 
the stage in the legal proceeding may also influence this analysis. 
1. Initial Interview 
When taking on a new client, an attorney must conduct interviews 
with the client and the client’s family, friends, and acquaintances.  
During these interviews, counsel should attempt to determine the 
client’s current and past mental health. 
During the client interview, counsel should ask, at a minimum, 
whether the client himself or anyone in the client’s family suffers from 
or has been treated for mental illness.  Counsel may also want to have 
the client fill out a questionnaire to determine the presence of any red 
flags possibly indicating mental illness, namely, prior head injury, low 
intellectual functioning, serious substance abuse, or past abuse.270  
Depending on the circumstances, counsel may also want to 
investigate other factors, such as toxin exposure and what 
medications the client is taking.271  Effective counsel should use this 
interview to determine other possible sources of information by 
asking what schools the client attended, if the client has ever been 
incarcerated, and whether the client interacted with social service or 
mental health agencies. 
After interviewing the client, counsel should also interview family, 
friends, and acquaintances.  In Perkins, for example, the Georgia 
                                                                                                                 
 269. See supra Parts III.C, III.D. 
 270. See id. (further discussing red flags and how they may give rise to a duty for 
counsel to investigate further, at least in capital cases). 
 271. See, e.g., Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1255 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding 
ineffective assistance of counsel in a capital case when counsel failed to investigate 
further or inform experts when they knew criminal defendant grew up on a farm and 
had a history “exposure to pesticides and toxic chemicals”—if they has investigated, 
they would have discovered defendant suffered from organic brain damage in part 
caused by this exposure). 
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Supreme Court found that Mr. Perkins’ attorneys were ineffective 
because they only interviewed his mother and ex-wife, and did not 
interview any of his other friends, family, or acquaintances.272  If they 
had conducted additional interviews, counsel would have learned that 
the defendant suffered from severe personality changes after a head 
injury.273 
Using this approach is a simple, effective way attorneys can search 
for red flags that will help guide them to determine where else they 
should look.  Opponents may argue that this interview approach is 
not ideal because it may lessen the independence of trial counsel, 
which may hinder their zealous advocacy.  However, this interview is 
simply a “minimal” standard, so it still remains perfectly permissible 
for counsel to do more than a mere interview.  Further, counsel 
already conducts client interviews, so this deeper probing interview 
would not drastically change how defense counsel represents their 
client. 
Second, opponents may argue that—for some clients—asking 
about mental health may upset the client and ruin the attorney-client 
rapport.  This is the argument the defense attorney gave in Perkins 
when the court found he had violated his Sixth Amendment rights.274  
At the end of the day, if there is mitigating information that would 
help with the defense, it is the defense attorney’s duty to try their best 
to find it—even if it offends the client.  Nevertheless, questions to 
help determine if there are any red flags may be asked in a non-
offensive matter if they are routinely made at an initial interview with 
a client. 
Third, opponents may argue it is unreasonable to expect attorneys 
to do so much.  This is exactly why the recommendations take into 
account the type of case and stage in the proceeding.  Defending a 
capital murder case—which is where the Sixth Amendment usually 
requires this evidence—is, of course, going to require more than 
defending a misdemeanor case. 
2. Background Investigation 
As the ABA Guidelines state, a “legal representation plan should 
provide for investigatory, expert, and other services” at all phases of 
                                                                                                                 
 272. See Perkins v. Hall, 708 S.E.2d 335, 340–41 (Ga. 2011); see also supra notes 1–
5 and accompanying text. 
 273. See Perkins, 708 S.E.2d at 343–44. 
 274. See supra Introduction. 
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trial if they are “necessary to quality legal representation.”275  Thus, 
counsel should not rely solely on the client’s initial interview.  The 
court in Perkins also found the attorneys ineffective because they 
failed to acquire medical records of the rake accident.276  Attorneys 
should try to acquire all reasonably available records, such as school 
records, medical records, the case file from prior incarceration, 
criminal history, facts surrounding a defendant’s prior crimes, social 
service records, and prior psychological evaluations.  This includes all 
records the attorney has learned of through their prior interviews or 
from other sources.  When attorneys get the records, they must also 
read them.  In Perkins, the medical records would have revealed that 
a rake actually penetrated Mr. Perkins’ brain.277 
3. Follow-Up if Red Flags Are Detected 
If a defense attorney has uncovered a red flag—a warning sign that 
their client may suffer from some neurological impairment—he or she 
may want to consider two things to help determine the next step.  
First, counsel may want to consider how neuroscience could influence 
a possible defense.  For example, if the accused is charged with 
premeditated murder, then neuroscience evidence could assist in a 
self-defense claim.  However, if the charge is negligent homicide, 
neuroscience evidence may not be as probative.  Second, the 
defendant’s attorney may want to consider how serious the red flag is.  
The red flag is serious in a case like Perkins, where prongs of a rake 
literally penetrated the accused’s brain and other evidence of brain 
damage existed.278  The red flag is less serious if the client had a sports 
concussion as a teenager and has shown no other effects, although 
this may, in conjunction with other factors, be important in some 
cases. 
In cases like Perkins, where competency, mental state, and 
mitigation in sentencing could make a difference, neuroscience 
evidence may be part of a valid defense.  In capital cases like Perkins, 
most mental health information could fit into a valid defense because 
it could be a mitigating factor during sentencing.  However, for less 
serious cases such as assault, neuroscience evidence may not be as 
vital for a defense. 
                                                                                                                 
 275. See ABA, supra note 63. 
 276. See supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text. 
 277. See supra Introduction. 
 278. See supra Introduction. 
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If it could fit into a valid defense, the attorney should try to 
determine how likely it is that the defendant suffers from brain 
damage.  The more serious the red flags, the greater the duty to 
thoroughly investigate.  In Perkins, for example, if counsel had 
interviewed Mr. Perkins’ family, friends, and associates—as this 
framework recommends—counsel would have learned Mr. Perkins 
suffered from head injury, serious sexual and physical abuse as a 
child, and substance abuse beginning at a young age—all indicators of 
brain injury.279  If an investigation reveals such red flags, especially if 
there is more than one, the client should be sent to a mental health 
professional for an examination.  During this examination, the mental 
health professional should look for possible brain damage by 
conducting an IQ test or a neuroscience examination on the client.280  
The mental health professional may also recommend brain scans to 
determine the extent of the brain damage.  This will both help ensure 
an informed diagnosis, and also help counsel understand the damage 
so that they can demonstrate such to a jury.281 
By following these steps, the minimum requirements of the Sixth 
Amendment should be satisfied.  The attorney will have investigated 
the case enough to make an “informed choice among possible 
defenses.”282  This is not to say that these steps will necessarily be 
enough to satisfy the Sixth Amendment in all cases, but rather, based 
on the U.S. Supreme Court standards, ABA Guidelines, and case law, 
this level of investigation will meet at least the minimum level of 
effective counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the important interests at stake, analyzing whether or not a 
criminal defendant had a fair trial with effective assistance of counsel 
should not be left to a “reasonableness” standard that gives no clear 
guidance to courts or attorneys.  The importance of the fundamental 
right to have criminal defendants effectively represented is too 
important to our adversarial system.  A brain injury or abnormality 
may be a real part of a criminal defendant’s background that would 
inform an attorney about the appropriate defense to pursue and, if 
such an injury exists, it may be too important for a defense attorney 
                                                                                                                 
 279. See Perkins v. Hall, 708 S.E.2d 335, 342 (Ga. 2011). 
 280. See supra Part I.C.1c. As noted in Part I.C.2, these tests measure 
psychological functions, such as attention and verbal function, and may indicate if 
there is a brain abnormality. 
 281. See supra Part 1.C. 
 282. See supra Part 1.A. 
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to let the technical and scientific nature of neuroscience evidence get 
in the way.  Attorneys must be aware of the obligations the ABA, 
U.S. Supreme Court, and other court cases have laid out to ensure 
they are effective advocates who strive to protect their clients’ civil 
liberties and fundamental right to a fair trial. 
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APPENDIX 
Criminal Cases Finding Counsel Ineffective for Failing to 
Develop Neuroscience Evidence 
April 1992 to March 2013 
 
 
U.S. Supreme Court Decisions 
 
2010 Sears v. Upton, 130 S. Ct. 3259 (2010) 
2009 Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009) 
2005 Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) 
2003 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) 
2000 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) 
 
 
Lower Federal and State Court Decisions 
 
2013  Littlejohn v. Trammell, 704 F.3d 817 (10th Cir. 2013) 
 Lacy v. State, 2013 Ark. 34, 2013 WL 460432 
2012  James v. Ryan, 679 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 
S. Ct. 1579 
 Lynch v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 897 F. Supp. 2d 1277 
(M.D. Fla. 2012) 
 Simmons v. State, 105 So. 3d 475 (Fla. 2012) 
2011  Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 2011) 
 Ferrell v. Hall, 640 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2011) 
 Goodwin v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 301 (6th Cir. 2011) 
 Hernandez v. Martel, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (C.D. Cal. 
2011) 
 Winston v. Kelly, 784 F. Supp. 2d 623 (W.D. Va. 2011) 
 Coleman v. State, 64 So. 3d 1210 (Fla. 2011) 
 Perkins v. Hall, 708 S.E.2d 335 (Ga. 2011) 
2010  Detrich v. Ryan, 619 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2010) 
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 Sinisterra v. United States, 600 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2010) 
 Deere v. Cullen, 713 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (C.D. Cal. 2010), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 718 F.3d 1124 
2009  Johnson v. Mitchell, 585 F.3d 923 (6th Cir. 2009) 
 Libberton v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) 
 Jones v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2009) 
 Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573 (9th Cir. 2009) 
 Richards v. Quarterman, 566 F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 2009) 
 Hummel v. Rosemeyer, 564 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2009) 
 Pierce v. Thaler, 355 F. App’x 784 (5th Cir. 2009) 
 Wesbrook v. Quarterman, 318 F. App’x 265 (5th Cir. 
2009) 
 Stankewitz v. Wong, 659 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (E.D. Cal. 
2009), aff'd, 698 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2012) 
 Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975 (Fla. 2009) 
 State v. Cooper, 979 A.2d 792 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 
2009) 
 State v. Barber, 206 P.3d 1223 (Utah Ct. App. 2009) 
2008  Correll v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2008) 
 Stallings v. Bagley, 561 F. Supp. 2d 821 (N.D. Ohio 2008) 
 United States ex rel. Harris v. McCann, 558 F. Supp. 2d 
826 (N.D. Ill. 2008) 
 State v. Pearce, 994 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 2008) 
2007  Morales v. Mitchell, 507 F.3d 916 (6th Cir. 2007) 
 Haliym v. Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2007) 
 Anderson v. Sirmons, 476 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2007) 
 Gilley v. Morrow, 246 F. App’x 519 (9th Cir. 2007) 
2006  Frierson v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2006) 
 Poindexter v. Mitchell, 454 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 2006) 
 Blackwood v. State, 946 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 2006) 
2005  Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2005) 
 Earp v. Stokes, 423 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2005), opinion 
suspended and amended on denial of reh’g, 431 F.3d 
1158 
 Smith v. Dretke, 422 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 2005) 
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2004  Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919 (10th Cir. 2004) 
 State v. Duncan, 894 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 2004) 
2003  Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2003) 
 Frazier v. Huffman, 343 F.3d 780 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 Powell v. Collins, 332 F.3d 376 (6th Cir. 2003) 
 State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 2003) 
2002  Hooper v. Mullin, 314 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2002) 
 Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2002) 
 Jennings v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2002) 
 Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2002) 
 People v. Harris, 794 N.E.2d 181 (Ill. 2002) 
 State v. Johnson, 794 A.2d 654 (Md. 2002) 
 Rylander v. State, 75 S.W.3d 119 (Tex. App. 2002), 
rev'd, 101 S.W.3d 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) 
2001  Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2001) 
 Smith v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2001) 
 Slaughter v. Parker, 187 F. Supp. 2d 755 (W.D. Ky. 
2001), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 450 F.3d 224 (6th Cir. 
2006) 
 Laird v. Horn, 159 F. Supp. 2d 58 (E.D. Pa. 2001) 
 Ragsdale v. State, 798 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 2001) 
2000  Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) 
 Morales v. Coyle, 98 F. Supp. 2d 849 (N.D. Ohio 2000), 
aff'd and remanded sub nom. Morales v. Mitchell, 507 
F.3d 916 (6th Cir. 2007) 
 State v. Carter, 734 N.E.2d 345 (Ohio 2000) 
1999  Wallace v. Stewart, 184 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 1999) 
 People v. Morgan, 719 N.E.2d 681 (Ill. 1999) 
1998  Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1998) 
 Seidel v. Merkle, 146 F.3d 750 (9th Cir. 1998) 
 Turpin v. Lipham, 510 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. 1998) 
1997  People v. Ruiz, 686 N.E.2d 574 (Ill. 1997) 
1995  Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204 (6th Cir. 1995) 
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1992  Waters v. Zant, 979 F.2d 1473 (11th Cir. 1992), vacated, 
11 F.3d 139 
 Loyd v. Whitley  977 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1992) 
 Buenoano v. Singletary, 963 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1992) 
 
